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The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”:
Probing the Extent of the VRA’s
Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy
Michael Halberstam*
This Article advances the controversial thesis that the preclearance provision under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is not as intrusive as is generally assumed. It
shows that the architecture of the preclearance regime is consistent with “new
institutionalist” models of administration that favor devolution and learning through
monitoring and disclosure. The Article thereby counters the unchallenged view—
articulated in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the legislative record, and scholarship—
that the U.S. Department of Justice’s authority to object to state and local election law
changes under the preclearance regime has amounted to a heavy-handed intervention
into state and local lawmaking processes.
More immediately, the Article speaks to the Supreme Court’s likely reconsideration of
the constitutionality of the VRA as no longer “congruent and proportional to an
ongoing constitutional violation” under the standard advanced in City of Boerne v.
Flores. It argues that the purported “federalism costs” of the preclearance regime
should not weigh as heavily in the constitutional balance as many have suggested.
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“[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have
1
surprisingly powerful influences on people’s choices.”

Introduction
2
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) represents one
of the most successful institutionalizations of civil rights. Section 5 has

1. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1159, 1161 (2003).
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been a “major legal engine for transforming American democracy over
3
the last forty years.” The VRA has brought about a revolution in
4
minority voting rights and set the stage for the historic electoral success
5
of Barack Obama. Indeed, “[t]he Voting Rights Act has been hailed as
the most important piece of Federal legislation in our Nation’s history,
not just the most important piece of civil rights legislation, but the most
6
important piece of legislation ever passed.”
Prior to the passage of the VRA, African-Americans and other
minorities were almost completely excluded from the political process
throughout the South. Legal discrimination and outright fraud in voter
registration, candidate slating, districting, and other voting practices and
procedures kept minorities from registering, voting, and electing
minority-preferred candidates. As late as 1967, fewer than 200 AfricanAmericans were elected to political office at any level in Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
7
Virginia. In 1964, a single black was elected to a state legislature in all of
8
the states originally targeted by the VRA. By 2000, that number had
9
reached 231. The total number of black elected officials increased
tenfold in Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas
10
between 1970 and 2000. Many experts believe the VRA, and in
2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).
3. Pam Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 Election L.J. 21,
21 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters: The
Voting Rights Act at Work 1982–2005, at 37, 40–49 (2006); Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman,
The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact
of the Voting Rights Act 1965–1990, at 379, 381 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1994) [hereinafter Quiet Revolution]; James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional
Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 893, 896
(1997) (confirming that the Voting Rights Act is sometimes raised to the status of a “quasiconstitution” and critically examining this view); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1714 (2004) (arguing data shows that
blacks are no longer “political outsiders in the covered jurisdictions”); Ellen Katz et al., Documenting
Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 643, 644 (2006) (“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . is one of the most remarkable
and consequential pieces of congressional legislation ever enacted.”); Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the
South? Regional Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power 183, 187, 208
(Ana Henderson ed., 2007) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006].
5. See Adam Liptak, Review of Voting Rights Act Presents a Test of History v. Progress, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 2009, at A16.
6. Renewing the Temporary Provisions of the Voting Rights Act: An Introduction to the Evidence,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of Wis. Sen. Russell
D. Feingold).
7. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Political Participation 15 (1968).
8. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Reauthorization of the Temporary Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act: An Examination of the Act’s Section 5 Preclearance Provision 38 tbl.4 (2006).
9. Id.
10. David A. Bositis, Joint Ctr. for Political & Econ. Studies, Black Elected Officials: A
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particular, section 5, played a significant role in bringing about these
11
dramatic changes.
Nonetheless, section 5 continues to be one of the most controversial
enactments by Congress. Section 5 requires covered state and local
jurisdictions to submit all new laws that affect elections to the federal
12
government for approval before they can be enforced. Procedurally, it
interjects the Department of Justice (DOJ) into state and local lawmaking processes, by some accounts turning the passage of every
13
election-related law into a “federal case.” Section 5 imposes an
automatic sixty-day stay on the enforcement of any state and local
election law in jurisdictions covered by the Act, during which time it
grants the DOJ the authority to veto the new law unless and until the
submitting jurisdiction has satisfied its burden of proving that the law will
14
have neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect.
As a result of this unusual institutional strategy, section 5
preclearance has, almost universally, been regarded as a uniquely heavyhanded federal intervention into state and local lawmaking. Justice Hugo
15
Black’s dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach epitomizes the
conventional view. With section 5, Justice Black wrote, “States cannot
pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first
being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their
policies, . . . [which amounts to treating them as] little more than
16
conquered provinces.” This charge has echoed throughout section 5
jurisprudence, most recently in a constitutional challenge in Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
17
(“NAMUDNO”). Having filed their complaint within days of the 2006
18
Reauthorization of the VRA, the petitioners described section 5 as “the
19
most federally invasive law in existence,” and argued that, in light of the
Statistical Summary app. at 28 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 Vand. L.
Rev. 1249, 1250–52 (1989).
12. “Coverage” extends to all or part of sixteen states: all of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas; most of Virginia; four counties in California; five
counties in Florida; two townships in Michigan; ten towns in New Hampshire; three counties in New
York; forty counties in North Carolina; and two counties in South Dakota. See Jurisdictions Covered
Under Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2010).
13. Personal Communication with Richard Bourne, Professor of Law, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of
Law (Nov. 2008). Mr. Bourne was a staff attorney with the DOJ Civil Rights Division just after the
passage of the VRA in 1965. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006).
15. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
16. Id. at 358–60 (Black, J., dissenting).
17. 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009).
18. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (2006)).
19. Jurisdictional Statement at 2, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2008 WL 4181890.
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dramatic improvements in vote discrimination since the VRA was passed
in 1965, Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of section 5 preclearance no
longer represented a “congruent and proportional” remedy for persisting
20
constitutional violations. The Court ultimately decided the matter on
alternate grounds: It expressly avoided addressing the constitutionality of
section 5, but emphasized in no uncertain terms that “the Act now raises
21
serious constitutional concerns.” Commenting on the Court’s decision,
Professor Ellen Katz has written that “Chief Justice [Roberts]
relentlessly pile[d] up reason after reason why the 2006 reauthorization is
constitutionally infirm,” signaling that, unless Congress acts to remedy its
22
deficiencies, the Court would not hesitate to step in.
This Article argues, counterintuitively and contrary to the
conventional wisdom, that the preclearance regime has been consistent
with decentralization and is not nearly as intrusive as is generally
assumed. Materially and substantively, section 5 is remarkably
accommodating to state and local preferences and practices. It is much
less disruptive than portrayed. Section 5 permits jurisdictions to retain or
experiment with their election systems, so long as they comply with the
information requests of an expanded monitoring system and show that
their chosen laws affecting elections satisfy a rather lenient
23
nonretrogression standard. The contention that section 5 is consistent
with decentralization and localism counters the unchallenged argument
that section 5’s “federalism costs” should weigh heavily in the
constitutional balance. To the contrary, the VRA’s relative sensitivity to
local autonomy and to the promotion of political participation by
governmental and nongovernmental actors contributed to its
phenomenal success. This alternative reading of section 5 affords a
critical perspective on the NAMUDNO decision, as well as of Bartlett v.
24
Strickland, which was decided during the previous term. I argue that the
NAMUDNO Court’s expansion of the bailout provision, and the
Strickland Court’s refusal to protect coalition districts are at crosspurposes.
The analysis presented in these pages also contributes to a broader
literature on institutional change and civil rights administration. It
compares the much more equivocal results of the one-person/one-vote
rule to the success of section 5 preclearance. In stark contrast to the
VRA’s “quiet revolution,” the Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote
command required immediate nationwide implementation of a uniform

20. Appellant’s Brief at 23, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246.
21. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2505.
22. Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO: A Response to Professor Amar, 61 Fla. L.
Rev. 991, 998 (2009).
23. See generally Karlan, supra note 3 (describing the evolution of the retrogression standard).
24. 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009).

Halberstam-62-HLJ-923 (Do Not Delete)

928

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/28/2011 12:21 PM

[Vol. 62:923

one-size-fits-all rule, that ultimately failed to vindicate the inherently
25
group-based rights threatened by vote dilution. Comparing how the
VRA succeeded in promoting a national antidiscrimination norm
without treating states and local jurisdictions like “conquered provinces”
speaks to the role of governance structures in the implementation of civil
rights. In exploring these contrasts, this Article seeks to extend an
institutional approach to the implementation of civil rights. It is
sympathetic to the pragmatic model of “experimentalist, learning-bymonitoring institutions,” elaborated by what some have referred to as a
26
“New Institutionalism.” As a study of VRA administration pointed out:
[J]ust as the necessary elements of a social service program are in the
hands of different individuals and groups, the capacity to comply (or
not to comply) with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act is in the
hands of officials in covered jurisdictions who are relatively independent
of those federal government officials who are seeking to obtain
27
compliance.

More recently, Professor Heather Gerken’s call for a “Democracy
Index” has issued the challenge of investigating and reporting more
systematically on the practices and procedures of state and local election
administration. Gerken’s purpose is to encourage best practices that
28
engage local actors in the service of democratization. Gerken and
others deplore what they see as the hyper-decentralization of the U.S.
29
election system. They blame localism and partisanship for the dismal
30
state of election administration. This Article argues that the preclearance

25. See, e.g., James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v.
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 Hastings L.J. 1, 3–4
(1982).
26. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 1017 (2007); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 271 (1998); Joanne Scott & Susan
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 565,
568 (2006); Susan Sturm, Conclusion to Responses—The Architecture of Inclusion: Interdisciplinary
Insights on Pursuing Institutional Citizenship, 30 Harv. J.L. & Gender 409, 410 (2007); Susan Sturm &
Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 6. For similar
developments in the area of human rights, see Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the
Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty,
13 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 5 (2010).
27. Howard Ball et al., Compromised Compliance: Implementation of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act 19 (1982).
28. Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and
How to Fix It 6 (2009); see also Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New
Institutionalism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1075, 1077 (2010) (book review).
29. Gerken, supra note 28, at 20, 21–23; Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election
Administration, 6 Election L.J. 118, 121 (2007) (reviewing Roy G. Saltman, The History and
Politics of Voting Technology: In Quest of Integrity and Public Confidence (2006)); see also
Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1582, 1586 (2009).
30. Gerken, supra note 28, at 15; see also Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law,
87 Tex. L. Rev. 787, 792 (2010) (reviewing Gerken, supra note 28).
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provision of the VRA is a comparative bright spot. “Because the
Democracy Index provides the right information in the right form,”
writes Gerken, “it should harness the two major obstacles to reform—
31
partisanship and localism—in the service of reform.” This Article shows
that the section 5 preclearance has embodied important aspects of such
an approach.
Part I articulates the standard view of section 5, which reflects the
widely held belief that progress in civil rights more generally has been
driven by the derogation of local autonomy and a “nationalization of
civil liberties.”
Part II discusses Congress’s 2006 Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization (“VRARA”) and the constitutional challenge to the
new VRA raised by the NAMUDNO case. It argues that the
NAMUDNO Court’s decision to reinterpret and expand the VRA’s
bailout provision offers key insights about the institutional structure of
the VRA.
Part III is the heart of the Article. It probes the extent of the VRA’s
encroachment on state and local autonomy. Part III.A clarifies how the
term “localism” is understood in the context of a “new institutionalism.”
III.B offers an alternative interpretation of the institutional architecture
of section 5 preclearance and its impact on local jurisdictions. III.C
considers the extent to which this alternative interpretation is consistent
with the different phases of section 5’s historical development.
Part IV questions the insistence on “straightforward, reasonably
administrable, mathematical” bright-line rules in the election context—
such as the Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote rulings and its recent
50% rule defining protected majority-minority districts in Bartlett v.
Strickland. Part V sets forth the constitutional implications and then
concludes.

I. The Standard View: Localism or Rights
The standard view of section 5’s intrusiveness reflects the standard
view of civil rights as uniform national regimes that admit of no local
variation, but are imposed by centralized authorities with the aim of
suppressing deviant local practices. Part I.A briefly outlines this
traditional liberal conception of rights. Part I.B describes in some detail
the charge of section 5’s extraordinary intervention into state and local
lawmaking.

31. Gerken, supra note 28, at 6.
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A. The Tensions Between Localism and Rights
There has always been a structural tension between localism and
32
rights. In the United States, federal civil rights that could be asserted
against the states were first “born in a burst of national centralization”
with the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and the expansion
33
of federal judicial power necessary to enforce them. The subsequent
“long march towards freedom” for African-Americans was, by most
accounts, accomplished by what Herbert Wechsler called the
34
“nationalization of civil rights.” This nationalization of governmental
authority, in the form of increasingly forceful federal civil rights
35
regimes, aimed precisely at the disruption of longstanding local
36
practices in the Jim Crow South. Meanwhile, elites in the South sought
to perpetuate local regimes of domination, exploitation, and exclusion by
appealing to States’ rights and constitutional limits on national
37
governmental authority.

32. See, e.g., Robert Post, Federalism and Civil Rights, in 3 Encyclopedia of the American
Constitution 1007 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000); see also Howard Ball
et al., supra note 27, at 117 (“[T]he extension of civil liberties, including voting rights, in the United
States has evolved out of a constant struggle to replace localized procedures with more standard,
national ones.”).
33. Post, supra note 32, at 1007.
34. See Herbert Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 12 Tex. Q. 10,
10 (Supp. 1968); see also Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in
Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 177 (Bernard Grofman
& Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter Controversies in Minority Voting].
35. See James T. Patterson, The Rise of Rights and Rights Consciousness, 1930s–1970s, in
Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History 1775–2000, at
201, 213–15 (Byron E. Shafer & Anthony J. Badger eds., 2001).
36. See Post, supra note 32, at 1007. (“These rights . . . were self-conscious efforts to eradicate
aspects of the indigenous culture of the southern states traceable to the institution of slavery.”
(emphasis omitted)); see also Anthony W. Marx, Race-Making and the Nation-State, 48 World Pol.
180, 203–04 (1996) (“In the United States the South had been appeased by allowing formal racial
discrimination on the local level. By midcentury . . . . greater central state consolidation and white
national unity [allowed] . . . . [t]he federal balance of power [to be] gradually reconfigured toward the
center. Meanwhile, despite Southern resistance, increased black protest encouraged by and pushing
for further reforms, pressed for the application of central power against localized racial policies. By
midcentury the centralized American polity had become strong enough to intervene in the historically
most contentious and last bastion of states’ rights. . . . [O]fficial racial domination was ended by strong
action from the center . . . .”).
37. See, e.g., Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina Speaks to Southern Governors,
February 7, 1948, in States’ Rights and American Federalism: A Documentary History 190–91
(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999) (reacting to President Truman’s call for a national
Commission on Civil Rights); The Southern Manifesto, 1956, in States’ Rights and American
Federalism, supra, at 203–04; States’ Rights Platform of 1948, Southern Democratic Convention,
Birmingham, Alabama, July 17, 1948, in States’ Rights and American Federalism, supra, at 193–95.
This pattern persists in that conservative opposition to expanded minority civil rights protections,
including voting rights, frequently takes the form of deploring “arbitrary federal interference with
local and state . . . arrangements in violation of the constitution.” Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose
Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 75 (1987).
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The gradual “nationalization of civil rights” culminated in the
Warren Court’s doctrine that federal civil rights protections were
minimum national standards of decency, below which no local
experimentation or variation would be tolerated. The Supreme Court
would stand as the final arbiter of such nationally uniform protections.
Justice Brennan articulated this view most forcefully:
I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment fully applied the provisions
of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states, thereby creating a federal
floor of protection and that the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment allow diversity only above and beyond this federal
constitutional floor. Experimentation which endangers the continued
existence of our national rights and liberties cannot be permitted; a call
for that brand of diversity is, in my view, antithetical to the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. While state
experimentation may flourish in the space above this floor, we have
made a national commitment to this minimum level of protection
through enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. This reconciliation
of local autonomy and guaranteed individual rights is the only one
38
consistent with our constitutional structure.

Separate from the Court’s (selective) incorporation of the Bill of Rights,
39
Congress, by means of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, “asserted centralized federal authority over areas of
policy (customer choice, job discrimination, voting requirements) that
had hitherto remained under local control” and produced novel national
40
administrative structures and methods of enforcement.
The tension between centralization and localism is also reflected in
41
the universalism/particularism debate in liberal political theory.
Fundamental rights have generally been understood to somehow
transcend the pluralistic give and take of national or local interest groups
in a democratic polity, guaranteeing universal freedoms to individuals
that apply uniformly throughout the nation and define what it means to
42
be not merely a citizen, but a person. Liberals disagreed on the list and
definition of such rights. But they agreed on the “priority” of these rights
over competing “conceptions of the good life,” or, put differently, over

38. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 550 (1986).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–d(7) (2006).
40. Graham, supra note 34, at 177, 184.
41. This conceptual tension can be resolved. First, the elusiveness of the content of such concepts
as natural rights, universal rights, human rights, and civil rights open up a space for diverse
interpretations. Second, conceptual clarity can be achieved at the level of principle, while recognizing
that the institutionalization of these principles, and their application and enforcement in practice,
involve specifications that are largely underdetermined by any theory.
42. This view was expressed most forcefully by John Rawls’s conception of the “priority of the
right over the good,” the classic philosophical statement of progressive liberalism in the 1960s and
1970s. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 31 (1971).
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self-understandings and value-systems that differed across communities
43
into which individuals were embedded.
B. Covered Jurisdictions as “Conquered Provinces”
According to the standard view, the VRA was no exception to this
narrative. Since its inception, the VRA, and the preclearance regime in
particular, have been regarded as an unprecedented federal intrusion
into state and local government autonomy that “destroys local control of
the means of self-government” and “strips locally elected officials of
44
their autonomy to chart policy.”
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Justice Hugo Black wrote
famously in dissent that, with section 5,
some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to
approve their policies, [and this] so distorts our constitutional structure
of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless. . . . I cannot help
but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces any
one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for
approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the
impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more
45
than conquered provinces.

The Supreme Court has upheld preclearance as a constitutional,
46
even if “uncommon,” use of congressional power, not because section
5’s substantial intrusion on state and local autonomy was a subject of
47
reasonable disagreement, but because “principles of federalism that
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority [were]
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War
48
Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’” In Lopez v. Monterey
County, the Court explained that:
We have recognized that the Act, which authorizes federal intrusion
into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial
“federalism costs.” The Act was passed pursuant to Congress’ authority
under the Fifteenth Amendment, however, and we have likewise
acknowledged that the Reconstruction Amendments by their nature

43. The idea of “human rights” is, in this sense, a closely related concept. See generally Louis
Henkin et al., Human Rights (2009) (providing a comprehensive analysis of human rights law).
44. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201–02 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358–60 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 334 (majority opinion).
47. The impassioned dissent from Justice Black on the threat to the principles of federalism posed
by section 5 has echoed down through later dissents of Justices Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, and
William Rehnquist. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 472–80 (1987) (Powell,
J., dissenting); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 140 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. City of Rome, 435 U.S. at 179 (majority opinion) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976)); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334 (majority opinion).
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contemplate some intrusion into areas traditionally reserved to the
49
States.

The preclearance regime of the VRA departed decisively from the
50
court-centered enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which
required citizens to bring suit and prove violations in the traditionally
51
more conservative courts. Such civil rights actions against state and
52
local officials vindicated violations ex post on a case-by-case basis. A
traditional civil rights action required that a plaintiff with standing show
intent and surmount considerable procedural hurdles in addition to
53
proving the facts and circumstances of the violation. In the election
context, the procedural hurdles are compounded by the fact that
elections are usually over by the time a court can consider the
constitutional violations.
In contrast, the preclearance regime is prophylactic and requires
covered jurisdictions to obtain approval for new election related laws ex
54
ante, that is, before such law can be placed on the books and enforced.
Section 5 requires covered state and local jurisdictions to submit all law
changes affecting voting to the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division (or the
55
District Court for the District of Columbia) for approval. The
submitting jurisdiction has the burden of showing that the law does not

49. 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (citations omitted) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995);
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179)); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000).
50. Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957).
51. Graham, supra note 34, at 182.
52. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to cast any doubt whatever
upon the indisputable power of the Federal Government to invalidate a state law once enacted and
operative on the ground that it intrudes into the area of supreme federal power. But the Federal
Government has heretofore always been content to exercise this power to protect federal supremacy
by authorizing its agents to bring lawsuits against state officials once and operative state law has
created an actual case and controversy.”).
53. See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Section 1983
Litigation 4 (2d ed. 2008) (“[E]ven if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a federally protected right,
she may not necessarily obtain relief. Courts may deny relief after resolving numerous other issues:
jurisdictional questions, such as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment, and
standing and mootness; affirmative defenses, such as absolute and qualified immunity; and other
issues, such as the statute of limitation, preclusion, and various abstention doctrines.”). Limitations on
§§ 1971 and 1973 actions prior to 1960 were even more significant. See generally Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that Congress enacted § 1983 to provide an independent federal remedy
supplement to the available state law remedies). This caused the NAACP and other civil rights
organizations to shift their strategy from litigation to mass-based protest. Frank R. Parker, Black
Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi After 1965, at 9 (1990).
54. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (“A federal law which assumes the power to compel the States to
submit in advance any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the government of our
country.”).
55. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52 (2010).
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56

discriminate. The Attorney General has the power to veto the law by
57
interposing an “objection.”
Because it operates ex ante, the preclearance process might be
compared to an injunction. Relying on this analogy, conservatives have
suggested that a heightened standard ought to apply to coverage by
section 5. In an ordinary civil rights action, only an emergency that
threatened irreparable harm to identifiable plaintiffs would justify
58
issuance of an injunction. In addition, such a remedy requires a
showing, by the plaintiff, that no other remedy at law could offer
adequate relief and that the preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order in fact serves to redress the harm of which some
59
complain.
Neither the statute nor the guidelines for the preclearance process
impose a heightened standard on the preclearance decision. The covered
jurisdiction must submit all new laws that affect voting for preclearance
regardless of whether concerns have been raised about the new law. The
submitting authority has the burden of proving it does not discriminate.
No plaintiff need come forward. The injunction analogy therefore only
highlights the unusual ex ante constraints placed on states and localities
by the preclearance regime.
It follows that submitting jurisdictions do not enjoy the full
procedural rights they would enjoy in court or under the Administrative
60
Procedure Act. The sixty-day review process is necessarily informal,
there is no opportunity for a hearing, and the determinations themselves
61
have been criticized as “standardless.” The Attorney General’s decision
is not subject to administrative review, except that a submitting
jurisdiction has the option of bringing a de novo action for preclearance
62
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia —a

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
59. In this vein, conservative opponents of the VRA have argued that such a heightened standard
should govern the inquiry under City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), as to the
“congruence and proportionality” of Congress’s use of its Civil War Amendment enforcement powers
in reauthorizing the VRA in 2006. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) & (b). Ed Blum and others have thus
suggested that preclearance can no longer be justified, because the national emergency of extreme
racism, exploitation, and political exclusion of the early- to mid-1960s in the South has passed. See
Edward Blum, Unintended Consequences of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 5 (2007).
60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–06 (2006).
61. In Miller v. Johnson, for example, plaintiffs argued that the flexibility was so great that the
DOJ’s Voting Section “has no established fact-finding procedures, no administrative hearing and no
discernible standards for evaluating information.” Brief of the Appellees at 41–42, Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (No. 94-631).
62. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006); Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491, 502
(1977). But this alternative to administrative preclearance is rarely pursued. Samuel Issacharoff et
al., The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 525 (3d ed. 2007).
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forum intentionally removed from the local district courts. A related
but separate issue is the persistent concern that section 5 gives a federal
executive agency undue discretion over state and local political geography
64
that can be manipulated for partisan political purposes.
The scope of the preclearance requirement has also been criticized
65
as overbroad and burdensome. Allen v. State Board of Elections,
66
together with Perkins v. Matthews, interpreted voting changes subject to
67
preclearance very broadly. The Supreme Court included at least seven
basic types of voting changes within the scope of section 5: redistricting,
annexation, changes in polling places, precinct changes, re-registration
procedures, incorporations, and changes in election laws such as filing
68
fees and at-large elections. Allen also required preclearance for changes
69
mandated by federal law.
The perceived intrusiveness of section 5 informed debates about the
70
VRARA. During the reauthorization debate, critics and defenders of
preclearance agreed that section 5 authorized a “unique” intrusion into
71
state and local autonomy with significant “federalism costs.” Echoing
the Rehnquist Court’s retrogression decisions, critics of section 5 urged

63. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (majority opinion) (“South Carolina
and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§ 4(a) and 5, buttressed by § 14(b) of the Act, abridge
due process by limiting litigation to a distant forum.”).
64. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 86 Tex. L.
Rev. 667, 668 n.4 (2008) (“Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in 1965 stressed the
partisan dangers of assigning preclearance to the Department of Justice.”); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, If
It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785 (2006).
65. 393 U.S. 544, 566–69 (1969).
66. 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1970) (holding that voting booth changes, annexation of land, and changes
from ward to at-large elections were voting changes subject to preclearance).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (declaring that preclearance extends to any “voting qualifications or
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” without further specification).
68. See Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 502–503 (1992); Allen, 393 U.S. at 565–69;
Howard Ball et al., supra note 27, at 19, 66–67.
69. Howard Ball et al., supra note 27, at 565 n.29. This became critically important during the
implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter Act), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2006), and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–
15545 (Supp. II 2002); see Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 283 (1997) (rejecting Mississippi’s argument
that Motor Voter’s implementation was not a covered change).
70. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (2006)).
71. Blum, supra note 59, at 4–5 (“Many legal observers noted that Section 5 was a significant
departure from the way responsibilities between the federal and state governments were allocated at
the time the Constitution was ratified. Section 5 did something no other bill in the history of the nation
had ever done before: For a limited period of time, it required every political subdivision targeted by
the act to get permission from the federal government before any change to election procedures could
take place. In other words, the federal government was no longer limited to challenging in the courts a
racially discriminatory change in election procedures or practices after it had gone into effect; the
federal government now had the power to prevent such changes from going into effect at all.”); see
also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 25–28 (statement of Roger Clegg).
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that the preclearance regime’s disproportionate interference in state and
72
local law should weigh heavily in the constitutional balance. Proponents
of section 5 conceded the “unique procedures it requires of states and
73
localities that want to change their laws.” Congress’s “vote was
remarkable,” wrote Professor Nathaniel Persily, “in that almost all
participants in the policy debate recognize[d] that section 5 of the VRA
represents a unique exception to the normal functioning of
74
federalism . . . .”

II. Controversies in the Wake of the VRARA
A constitutional challenge to section 5 was expected to reach the
Court after Congress passed the VRARA. The VRARA renewed key
75
sunsetting provisions of the VRA for another twenty-five years. It also
overturned two important decisions by the Court that had rolled back
the kind of racial vote discrimination that would trigger an objection by
76
the Attorney General under section 5. In reversing these decisions,
77
Congress threw down the gauntlet to the Court.

72. Appellants in NAMUDNO echoed the Rehnquist Court’s retrogression decisions, which
stressed the heavy “federalism costs” of section 5 preclearance and repeated the arguments of critics
on record against VRARA. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320,
336 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997); Blum, supra
note 59, at 5; U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 53–54 (statement of Abigail Thernstrom,
Vice Chair).
73. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L.J. 174,
177 (2007) (“[Section 5] stands alone in American history in its alteration of authority between the
federal government and the states and the unique procedures it requires of states and localities that
want to change their laws. No other statute applies only to a subset of the country and requires
covered states and localities to get permission from the federal government before implementing a
certain type of law.”).
74. Id. at 180.
75. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (2006)); see also Persily, supra note 73.
76. The monitoring and preclearance provision under section 5 had been interpreted by the Court
to permit de facto constitutional violations, but not changes in the law that would roll back or
“retrogress” the voting rights gains by blacks and other protected minorities. In Bossier Parish I, the
Supreme Court took this doctrine to its extreme when it held that only a specific “intent to retrogress”
could trigger an objection. 520 U.S. at 328. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court redefined how
safeguarding the “minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral franchise” would henceforth be
understood, permitting trade-offs between influence districts and majority-minority districts under
section 5’s nonretrogression standard and undercutting the “ability to elect” minority-preferred
candidates as the measure of progress. 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003). The VRARA restored the intent
standard and reaffirmed ability-to-elect districts as the focus of minority vote dilution inquiry. Sec. 5,
§ 5(b)–(c), 120 Stat. at 580–81.
77. Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 Yale L.J.
Pocket Part 148, 153 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html.
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A. Congress’s Failure of Deliberation
The Supreme Court had, over the years, made it increasingly clear
that it would carefully scrutinize the congressional record to police
Congress’s use of its enforcement powers under the Civil War
78
Amendments. The VRARA was generally perceived to have rendered
section 5 and its related provisions particularly vulnerable in this regard.
The VRARA renewed section 5 and the other sunsetting provisions of
the Act for another twenty-five years without further amendment. Due
to political pressure and the complexity of the issues involved, Congress
inadequately addressed how the VRA might be amended to reflect the
79
dramatic progress in racial and minority inclusion in voting since 1965.
Conservatives argued that section 5 was a “temporary, emergency”
80
regime in 1965 and that “the emergency has passed.” During the period
leading up to the passage of the VRARA, leading scholars on all sides
recognized that progress in racial vote discrimination should be reflected
81
in the renewal legislation.
For example, coverage by the preclearance provision continues to
be triggered by a formula that singles out the Southern states. Coverage
is, inter alia, based on the proportion of minority voter registrants or
82
votes cast in a given state in 1964 or 1968. But the numbers have
changed significantly since then, with the proportion of registered
minority voters in some covered states exceeding those in states that are
83
exempt from preclearance. Evidence that private enforcement actions
under section 2 were no more common in covered jurisdictions than in
jurisdictions exempt from preclearance has been taken to suggest that
discrimination was just as likely to occur in jurisdictions not covered by

78. See generally Ellen Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 Vill. L. Rev.
1179 (2001) (describing the Supreme Court’s increasingly hostile position on the Attorney General’s
exercise of her preclearance powers).
79. See Katz, supra note 22, at 991–95, 997–1000; Persily, supra note 73, at 119–44.
80. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Emergency Exit, N.Y. Sun (Jul. 29, 2005), http://www.nysun.com/
article/17784; see also Blum, supra note 59, at 5–10; U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 26
(statement of Roger Clegg); id. at 21–23 (statement of Edward Blum); id. at 53–54 (statement of
Abigail Thernstorm); Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Voting Rights Act: After 40 years, It’s Time
for Virginia to Move on, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 1, 2005, at A11.
81. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1710; Richard H. Pildes, Political Competition and the
Modern VRA, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act 1, 7–8 (David Epstein et al. eds., 2006)
(concluding that political developments with regard to racial minorities had so improved in this
country, in large part due to the success of the Voting Rights Act, that section 5 as applied preAshcroft could actually harm the rights of minority voters); Tokaji, supra note 64, 785–86; see also The
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 11–13, 198–207 (2006) (testimony and prepared statement of Richard H. Pildes). But see id. at
4–6, 8–9 (2006) (testimony of Professors Pamela S. Karlan and Theodore S. Arrington).
82. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a, 1973b(a), 1973c (2006).
83. Tokaji, supra note 64, at 273.
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84

the Act. Instead, the persistence of racially polarized voting in covered
(Southern) states was heavily relied upon as evidence for the continued
need for the special provisions of the VRA; however, racially-polarized
voting is also prevalent in many non-covered jurisdictions, which are not
85
subject to preclearance.
Some commentators therefore proposed changes in the coverage
86
formula. Gerken, for example, argued for expanding potential coverage
nationwide, but limiting actual coverage to only those jurisdictions that
87
had “opted in.” Under the “opt-in” proposal, coverage by the
preclearance regime would be triggered upon the application of local
88
minority representatives to the DOJ. An “opt-in” trigger, according to
Gerken, would preserve the power of minority groups to bargain for
89
equal representation in the shadow of section 5. Gerken’s proposal had
the virtue of basing coverage on actual state and local conditions as they
currently exist, rather than on an outdated formula that many deem
arbitrary.
Another proposal to update coverage was to expand the bailout
90
provision. Jurisdictions covered by section 5 can apply to terminate
coverage, or “bail out.” To terminate coverage, a jurisdiction must show
that it has not discriminated for at least ten years and has made
consistent efforts to expand minority participation in all aspects of the
91
political process. Few jurisdictions have availed themselves of the
92
bailout provision, in part, because bailout was restricted. Towns, cities,

84. See Katz, supra note 4, at 188 (showing that although roughly the same number of section 2
decisions were identified in covered jurisdictions and uncovered jurisdictions, plaintiffs were more
likely to prevail in covered jurisdictions). Whereas section 5 of the VRA requires covered jurisdictions
to submit all new laws that affect voting to the United States Attorney General for “preclearance,”
section 2 of the VRA, as amended, provides a private right of action to challenge racial vote
discrimination nationwide. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Section 2 essentially tracks the language in the
Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
85. Katz, supra note 4, at 188; see also Heather K. Gerken, Essay, A Third Way for the Voting
Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-in Approach, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 708, 745 (2006). Katz argues, based
on the empirical record in section 2 cases, that racially polarized voting in covered jurisdictions is often
more extreme. See Katz et al., supra note 4. Ultimately, Congress relied on Katz’s study, which
appears in the Appendix to the congressional record of the VRARA. To Examine the Impact and
Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 964–1124 (2005) (including study from the Voting Rights
Initiative of the University of Michigan Law School).
86. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 85; Michael P. McDonald, Who’s Covered? Coverage Formula
and Bailout, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 81, at 255.
87. Gerken, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, supra note 4, at 257; McDonald, supra note 86, at 268.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2006).
92. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2599–834 (2005)
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and other local government units within covered states could not bail out
93
separately from their counties. Because states or counties eligible for
bailout must show that all of their political subdivisions are eligible for
bailout, statewide elections in that county are still covered until the
entire state can show that it meets the criteria for bailout, even if
94
counties can make that showing. As a result, only twelve jurisdictions—
out of more than 12,000 covered political subdivisions—have successfully
95
bailed out of the Act since 1982. To expand the bailout provision would
96
have provided one way to phase out preclearance over time. One
proposal made during the reauthorization debate was for Congress to
examine the possibility of allowing local governmental subunits within a
97
covered county to bail out.
98
Neither these nor other proposals for reform were adopted.
Instead, Congress amended the VRA only to reinstate the construction
of the Act that had existed prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish II) and Georgia v.
99
Ashcroft, while renewing the Act for another twenty-five years. Many
commentators have described congressional action on the VRARA as a
100
“failure of deliberation.” In the NAMUDNO case, the Supreme Court
101
“found a way to send the statute back to Congress for deliberation.”
(detailing the bailouts).
93. In the rare exception that a town or city conducted its own voter registration, it could seek
bailout under section 4(a), as amended in 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1988).
94. See generally Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 231
(D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the expansion of bailout eligibility in the 1982 amendments to include
political subdivisions), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009); Hebert, supra note 90, at 257 (discussing the number of bailouts since the 1982 amendments).
95. Hebert, supra note 90, at 257.
96. See Rick Hasen, Drafting a Proactive Bailout Measure for VRA Reauthorization, Election
Law Blog (May 18, 2006, 9:37 AM), http://www.electionlawblog.org/archives/005655.html (proposing
a “proactive bailout measure” as part of the VRA reauthorization). But see J. Gerald Hebert, Bailouts
and the Voting Rights Act: Observations About Rick Hasen’s Proposals, Campaign Legal Ctr. Blog
(June 20, 2006), http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-34.html (critiquing Hasen’s proposal).
97. Hebert, supra note 90, at 274. Hebert has served as legal counsel to all of the jurisdictions that
have bailed out since the 1982 amendments were enacted. Id. at 257 n.1.
98. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 86, at 262–70 (discussing modification of the definition of
“Test or Device,” modification of the participation component in the coverage formula, modification
of the bailout mechanism, and certain technical amendments to section 4, upon which section 5
depends); Tokaji, supra note 64, at 830–35 (arguing for the establishment of an independent bipartisan
commission or “super agency” for voting to administer preclearance, and allowing opponents to
challenge a DOJ preclearance decision in court); Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Op-Ed., Do
the Right Thing, Wall St. J., July 15, 2005, at A10 (arguing that Congress should let section 5 expire in
2007).
99. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, and César E. Chàvez Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, S. Rep. No. 109-295, at 15 (2006) (citing
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S.
320 (2000)).
100. Katz, supra note 22, at 999.
101. Id.
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B. NAMUDNO’s Promise
Congress’s failure to tailor the VRARA to changed circumstances
was front and center in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No.
102
One v. Mukasey, a case that reached the Supreme Court in 2009. The
plaintiff in NAMUDNO was a special purpose district in Texas that
sought relief from the burdens of preclearance by seeking bailout under
103
section 4(b) of the VRA. In the alternative, NAMUDNO claimed that
section 5 was unconstitutional, because the severe encroachments of the
preclearance requirement could no longer be justified as a “congruent
104
and proportional” remedy for ongoing constitutional violations.
NAMUDNO was filed with the District Court for the District of
Columbia within days of the passage of the VRARA. Its progress was
closely watched.
To bail out from under the special provisions of the act, an eligible
jurisdiction must seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel
in the D.C. court and essentially prove that during the past ten years, it
105
had not engaged in any racial vote discrimination. A jurisdiction must
show that for the previous ten years, it had not used any forbidden voting
test, had not received a valid objection under section 5, and had not been
found liable for other voting rights violations. It must also show that it
had “engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and
106
harassment” of voters, and similar measures. The plaintiff argued that
the district had never engaged in racial vote discrimination, had never
been found guilty of racial vote discrimination, and had made
107
constructive efforts to counter racial vote discrimination.
NAMUDNO’s first claim turned on whether the district was a
108
“political subdivision” eligible for bailout under the Act. Bailout is
available to smaller political units that are covered separately under the
109
Act, such as parts of New York City or Southern California. The VRA,
however, did not at first permit political subdivisions to bail out
separately if they were covered as part of a covered state. The 1982
amendments expanded bailout to permit “political subdivisions,” such as
counties or parishes to terminate coverage, even if their state did not

102. 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 268 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One
v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006).
104. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a).
106. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F).
107. Appellant’s Brief at 9–10, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009) (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246.
108. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).
109. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980) (finding a city ineligible to seek
bailout, because “the coverage formula of § 4(b) ha[d] never been applied to it.”).
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110

satisfy the bailout requirements. More specifically, section 14(c)(2)
provides that “[t]he term ‘political subdivision’ shall mean any county or
parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under
the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other
111
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” Thus,
cities, towns, and other political subdivisions covered as part of a larger
political unit could not bail out separately; their fate depended on the
112
status of the larger political unit: the county, parish, or state.
113
NAMUDNO was neither a county nor a city; nor did it register voters.
Accordingly, the district court ruled that NAMUDNO was not entitled
to bail out, because it was not a “political subdivision” within the special
114
The district court’s
meaning of section 14(c)(2) of the VRA.
interpretation of the bailout provision was unsurprising. It complied with
Supreme Court precedent and long-settled statutory interpretation
115
principles.
The bulk of the district court’s opinion focused on the constitutional
challenge to section 5, as reauthorized by the VRA: It contained a
lengthy and detailed examination of the facts and data adduced by
116
Congress in support of reauthorization. Judge Tatel rejected the
plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to section 5 and held that the evidence
of continuing violations that Congress relied on was sufficient to justify
the restrictions imposed on states and localities by the preclearance
117
regime.
The case went up to the Supreme Court on direct appeal. In a
unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court
118
reversed. The Court granted NAMUDNO the right to seek bailout by
revisiting and substantially expanding the scope of the statutory bailout
119
provision. The Court held that bailout was not limited to political
120
subdivisions within the special meaning of the Act. Under the Court’s
reinterpretation of the statute, bailout would now be available to any
political subunit that could meet the criteria. The bailout provision thus

110. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 1, 96 Stat. 131, 131–34
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
111. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 4(c)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006)).
112. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 231–32 (D.D.C. 2008).
113. Id. at 283.
114. Id.
115. See Katz, supra note 22, at 997–98.
116. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 248–83.
117. Id. at 279–82.
118. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517 (2009).
119. Id. at 2514–16.
120. Id. at 2516.
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became available to thousands of cities, townships, and special purpose
districts, such as NAMUDNO.
Notably, the Supreme Court refrained from striking down the
preclearance regime, but instead tweaked the existing statutory and
administrative framework to permit incremental changes. It empowered
local actors to apply for bailout. The bailout determination is henceforth
based on local conditions, which local jurisdictions have the power to
affect.
Because many more political units and subunits are now eligible for
121
preclearance, observers expected an increase in bailout requests.
Presumably, cities that achieve bailout will reflect something like “best
practices” or at least better practices. Cities that have not yet bailed out,
but are interested in doing so, can presumably look to cities that have in
order to see how it is done and what it takes. The new bailout scheme
should, therefore, encourage the adoption of something like “best
122
practices.” Furthermore, the more cities that bail out, the greater the
stigma to those that do not. Political units can now come clean if they
want. After NAMUDNO, their fate is in their own hands. Lingering local
resentment against being singled out as racist, and subjected to ongoing
monitoring by Washington, reasonably should give way to selfexamination. Cities surrounded by neighbors who have successfully
bailed out can no longer blame outdated conceptions or unfounded bias
123
for their subjection to the preclearance regime.
Whereas the Court expressly avoided the broader constitutional
issue, it emphasized in no uncertain terms that the Act “raises serious

121. Telephone Interview with J. Gerald Hebert, Attorney (Nov. 18, 2010); see also Jeremy Duda,
Dumping a Burden: Counties Pick Right Time to Challenge Voting-Rights Strictures,
AZCapitolTimes.com (Feb. 4, 2011, 8:10 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2011/02/04/dumping-aburden-counties-pick-right-time-to-challenge-voting-rights-strictures/.
122. See, e.g., Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act:
An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 Urb. Law. 379, 381–82 (1985) (arguing that bailout standard
provides incentive to comply with federal antidiscrimination standard).
123. See, e.g., Jackson’s Plan Would Extend Voting Wrongs, Mobile Reg., Mar. 12, 2005, at A12
(“In today’s United States, 140 years after the Civil War and 40 years after the passage of the original
Voting Rights Act of 1965, there is no reason to treat Southern states differently than other
states. . . . The problem with the current system is that it treats the Southern states as guilty until
proven innocent, and makes all those states’ residents into second-class citizens compared to the rest
of the country.”). So far, only two cities have bailed out post-NAMUDNO: Sandy Springs, Georgia,
and Kings Mountain, North Carolina. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S.
Reaches Agreements with Kings Mountain, N.C., and Sandy Springs, Ga. to Terminate Coverage from
Preclearance of the Voting Rights Act (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/
10-crt-1067.html. Another eight bailout applications are pending. This represents an increase in
bailout applications. But Gerry Hebert, who is the attorney handling bailouts for many of these
jurisdictions, believes this increase is likely related to the upcoming redistricting rounds. To the extent
that more bailouts have not occurred, Hebert suggests that the very limited costs of 99% of
preclearance submissions (as low as $100 in County time), relative to the upfront cost of bailout, may
be responsible for the lack of activity. Telephone Interview with J. Gerald Hebert, supra note 121.
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constitutional questions,” which the Court would not shrink from
124
addressing the next time the issue came before it. “[T]he Act imposes
current burdens and must be justified by current needs,” the Chief
125
Justice wrote. Commentators have noted that the “Chief Justice
relentlessly pile[d] up reason after reason why the 2006 reauthorization is
constitutionally infirm[,]” signaling that unless Congress acts to remedy
126
its deficiencies, the Court would not hesitate to step in.
The NAMUDNO Court’s decision is all the more remarkable
because it can only be seen as a willful reinterpretation of the bailout
statute. Katz writes that in NAMUDNO, “all nine Justices agreed that
the VRA allowed the plaintiff to apply for a statutory exemption that
Congress never authorized and never intended to allow . . . . [T]he
127
128
Justices simply rewrote it.” In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court went
out of its way to strike down congressional limits on corporate and union
expenditures on political campaigns in a case that could easily have been
129
treated as an applied challenge to the McCain-Feingold Act. In
NAMUDNO, the Court did the opposite. It interpreted a facial
constitutional challenge to the VRA as an applied challenge, granting
relief to the plaintiff where the statute clearly prohibited such relief. The
only way of granting relief was for the Court to step into the shoes of the
legislature and rewrite the statute.
The Court essentially remanded the VRARA to Congress for
further deliberation. As Katz puts it, the Court “wisely focused on
130
getting Congress to do its job.” But it also gave Congress important
positive guidance on how to proceed. When the Court stepped into the
shoes of Congress and rewrote the statute, the Court exercised its
judgment about the functions of the VRA. The decision, as I argue in the
following parts, reflects the original architecture of the VRA as a
learning/monitoring regime that seeks to harness local energies in the
service of a national antidiscrimination policy—even as it promotes
compliance.

III. Local Autonomy Under Section 5 Reconsidered
The conventional assumption that the federal preclearance regime
represents heavy-handed federal interference with state and local lawmaking has not been adequately considered in light of intergovernmental

124. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513.
125. Id. at 2512.
126. Katz, supra note 22, at 998–99.
127. Id. at 992, 997.
128. 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
129. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).
130. Katz, supra note 22, at 999.
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practice or developing conceptions of institutional design. The view rests
almost exclusively on constitutional theories of state sovereignty
131
narrowly applied to black letter law. This Part will show that the
preclearance regime appears in a different light when viewed through the
lens of contemporary models of decentralization, regulatory competition,
and pragmatic “learning/monitoring institutions.” Contrary to the
conventional view, I argue that preclearance has maintained local
autonomy and encouraged local participation. It has built on existing
practices and local knowledge. At the same time, it has advanced a
fundamental political transformation and brought thousands of
jurisdictions into greater compliance with a demanding and evolving
national antidiscrimination standard. Part III.B shows how preclearance
shares many features of what is sometimes referred to as a “new
institutional” approach to governance.
Before moving on to this argument, some clarification of my
theoretical framework and terminology is in order. In particular, the
following provides some theoretical context for the meaning and
normative significance of “localism” in the context of a “new
132
institutionalism,” as it is understood here.
A. The Significance of “Localism” for the “New Institutional”
Framework
Critics of modern nation-building and statism since Friedrich Hayek
have aptly described state bureaucracies and other national state actors
as “vexed institutions,” characterized by the need to obtain information
about and intervene into complex local systems that they can ultimately
133
only survey and control by means of “thin simplifications.” Such thin
simplifications abstract considerably from the social practices and

131. Resnik and others have pointed out the questionable nature of judgments that rely on such
theories of sovereignty. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning
the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1926–28 (2003).
132. Note that the understanding presented here draws on a number of sources and literatures.
The treatment to some extent hijacks the term “new institutionalism” and expands on its more narrow
understanding in legal academia by a group of scholars who have been associated with Columbia Law
School. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959 (2007) (proposing a new paradigm for understanding
“federal empowerment of local governments”); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26 (discussing a new form of
government in which local actors are granted autonomy while also sharing their information with
regional and national bodies); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Interdisciplinary Insights on
Pursuing Institutional Citizenship, 30 Harv. J.L. & Gender 409 (2007) (addressing structural inequality
and the “concepts of institutional citizenship, organizational catalyst, and institutional intermediary”).
The perspective adopted here draws firsthand from insights in various disciplines and debates,
including new institutional economics, the democracy and decentralization debates (for want of a
better term), and conceptions of local knowledge in economics, anthropology, and political science.
133. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed 11 (1998).
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institutions that they seek to describe, thus failing to satisfy the
informational requirements of centralized decisionmakers. Different
approaches and outcomes are likely to emerge in different geographies
to the extent that interested local actors respond contextually and
134
experientially to identical system-wide goals. Unintended consequences
thus bedevil transformations driven by excessive government
centralization that fails to appreciate the need for local variation in the
development and implementation of policy goals. Examples abound
among the grand projects of nation-building and modernization during
135
the twentieth century.
Critiques of excessive centralization have promoted a healthy
skepticism about finding one right solution that applies system-wide.
They have instead emphasized the importance of “local knowledge,”
contextual judgment, or praxis—whatever the preferred term. Local
knowledge is based on experiential learning, is embedded in meaningful
practices, and cannot be readily standardized and transferred in the form
136
of information. Centralized decisionmakers cannot adequately replicate
or anticipate the experientially-based and contextual response of
interested local actors who base their judgments on their “particular
137
Thus, social scientists have
circumstances of time and place.”
increasingly become sensitive to the way in which the attempt at
rendering legible diverse local populations, social practices, political
interests, and geographies to a central state authority—in standardized,
formal, often mathematical terms deemed suitable to bureaucratic
administration—has contributed to positively shaping and homogenizing
the social and natural objects of such an abstracting gaze with
138
unintended consequences. Existing local patterns are forced into
informational grids that render them accessible to the central authority in

134. Professor Friedrich A. Hayek has argued that central planning is inefficient (and socially and
politically destructive), because such planning cannot satisfy its own informational requirements. F.A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 5, 7–8 (2005). Central planning must
necessarily operate based on limited knowledge that abstracts from particular local conditions and
exigencies. Id. In contrast, Hayek argued that a market-based allocation through the price-mechanism
relies on millions of transactions between individuals who base their decisions on their context-specific
local, often tacit knowledge, thus harnessing local and tacit knowledge by millions of individuals. Id.
According to Hayek, each person “has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique
information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation.” Id.
135. See generally Scott, supra note 133 (discussing the recurring patterns of failure and
authoritarianism in certain social engineering programs).
136. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive
Anthropology 167–234 (1983); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 3–25 (1966); Scott, supra
note 133; Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 85–104 (1994);
Hayek, supra note 134, at 521–22.
137. Hayek, supra note 134, at 521.
138. Scott, supra note 133.
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ways that answer to state administrative goals and policies, but abstract
from key features of social and ecological systems that support or render
them meaningful. To mitigate the vicissitudes of these (and other)
difficulties of centralized actors, researchers and policymakers across the
political spectrum have advocated increased local autonomy to specify
139
policy goals, tailor policy implementation, and set priorities.
In legal literature, “localism” has been identified with the normative
call for greater local autonomy and the positive claim of local legal
powerlessness advanced by Professor Gerald Frug and other
communitarian or progressive (“grassroots”) local government scholars
140
in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, conservative neofederalists increasingly embraced localism, justifying limits on federal
authority under the U.S. Constitution by appealing to these benefits of
decentralization and then tracing them back to the values of
141
Tocquevillian democracy.

139. See generally U.S. Aid, Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook (2009)
(setting forth comprehensive policy recommendations); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26; John M. Cohen
& Stephen B. Peterson, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Decentralization (Harvard Inst. for
Int’l Dev., Discussion Paper No. 555, 1996), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/555.pdf; T.N.
Srinivasan, Federalism, Decentralization, Globalization and Economic Reforms: Some Issues (Ctr. for
Research on Econ. Dev. & Pol’y Reform, Working Paper No. 158, 2003), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/redpr158.pdf
(discussing IMF, World Bank, and National Policies).
140. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls
17, 64–65 (1999) [hereinafter Frug, City Making]; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The
Structure of Local Government, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1990); Jerry Frug, The Geography of
Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (1996) [hereinafter Frug, Geography]; Jerry Frug,
Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253, 254 (1993) [hereinafter Frug, Decentralization];
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 Rutgers L.J. 627, 627–28 (2001).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(cataloguing the benefits of federalism); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Th[e]
federalist structure of joint sovereigns . . . assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”); Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory
of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 Duke L.J. 979, 980 (1993) (discussing
“normative federalism” and the general agreement on the Court that “federalism exists for a
purpose”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 Yale L.J. 947, 999
(2001) (“[F]ederalism . . . promotes policy diversification and decentralization.”); Steven G. Calabresi,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 24,
26–29 (2001) (describing federalism as “constitutionally mandated decentralization” that promotes
local preferences); Dennis M. Cariello, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the Values
of Federalism, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1493, 1559 (1999) (“Federalism is theory of decentralization in
government. As such, it shares a number of the economic benefits of decentralization.”); A.E. Dick
Howard, Does Federalism Secure or Undermine Rights?, in Federalism and Rights 11–12 (Ellis Katz
& G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996) (discussing some of the benefits and drawbacks of federalism); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215,
223 (2000) (“Federalism must be understood as . . . an institutional strategy formulated to assure a
greater degree of decentralization than is ever likely to be seen in a unitary system.”); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987)
(presenting the intellectual case for federalism); John O. McGinnis, In Praise of the Efficiency of
Decentralized Traditions and Their Preconditions, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 523, 526 (1999)
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But just as the progressive localism of the 1980s and 1990s has been
criticized for relying on formal legal categories and relatively abstract
ideal terms in its positive descriptions and normative critiques of
142
American local government law, so too has the neo-federalist version
143
of localism. Professor Richard Briffault has convincingly argued that
these claims—that local governments lack sufficient legal power—are
based on black-letter law but do not reflect intergovernmental practice,
and that the “new localists” tend to exaggerate the virtues of enhancing
144
local government. As Briffault has shown, and as has increasingly been
recognized in the literature, descriptive analysis of constraints placed on
local power by legal regimes must be policy-specific and take into
145
account the broader institutional setting. More recently, a small group
of legal scholars—such as Briffault—have drawn more explicitly on
developments in economics, history of economics, organizational theory,
and management theory, to probe and address public policy, including
questions involving the administration of civil rights that are generally
146
not viewed in such terms. And in the private law area, Erica Gorga and
the Author have argued for a “knowledge-based theory of the firm,”
147
relying on similar sources as these “new institutionalists.”
The analysis of the VRA’s preclearance regime provided in Parts
III.B and III.C attempts to provide the type of policy-specific contextual
assessment of local autonomy under the VRA called for by Briffault. It
reexamines the standard description of the constraints that the
preclearance process is said to place on local power, accounts for the
details of intergovernmental practices, considers concrete burdens and
results, and compares the regime to other enforcement measures. In so
doing, it also takes into account that institutions are practices and
routines that fix power relations between individuals and groups but,
importantly, also embody social techniques and learning. However
fervent are the attempts at fixing such power relations, institutional

(“[F]ederalism . . . was the Framers’ most important contribution to protecting decentralized
traditionmaking.”); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 409, 504 (1999)
(“[D]iversity is part of the genius of federalism, which allows for . . . efficiency-enhancing
decentralization . . . .”).
142. Briffault, supra note 140, at 1–2; see also Rodriguez, supra note 140, at 627–28.
143. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377, 378–82
(2001).
144. See Briffault, supra note 140, at 1–2.
145. Id. at 1–3; see also Barron, supra note 143, at 378–82; Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism,
24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2002) [hereinafter Cross, Folly of Federalism]; Frank B. Cross, Institutions
and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529 (2000) [hereinafter Cross, Institutions
and Enforcement].
146. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26, at 323–39.
147. Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure:
Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1123, 1125–27 (2007).
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change is constant and inevitable. The resulting disruption of both power
relations and knowledge sets has been managed successfully by the
design and implementation of the preclearance regime.
B. Section 5 as a Learning/Monitoring Regime
It is rarely observed that preclearance leaves the design of local
election systems in the hands of state and local officials. State and local
officials decide on voter registration qualifications, practices and
procedures, what type of voting systems to adopt, how to district, where
to locate polling places, and where to expand cities by annexing
neighboring populations. So long as the new law, practice, or procedure
does not violate the antidiscrimination standard, there is no substantive
148
federal input. Decisions on election design remain in local hands.
Section 5’s liability rule is an open standard, not a categorical, onesize-fits-all rule. It requires that the new laws that affect voting “neither
ha[ve] the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the
149
right to vote on account of race or color.” The standard does not
specify what changes a state, county, or city should adopt. The practices
and the standard itself have evolved to accommodate changing
circumstances and changing conceptions and measures of vote
discrimination. Section 5 is, therefore, nothing like the categorical, onesize-fits-all rule of strict equality imposed by the one-person/one-vote
150
151
cases, the universal ban on literacy tests, or the recently announced
152
50% rule for majority-minority districts under section 2 of the VRA. It
does not impose a fixed rule.
The preclearance process promotes incremental change. Only new
153
laws and practices must be precleared. Existing laws and practices are

148. To be sure, Congress has increasingly federalized election law by other means. In particular it
passed the National Voter Registration Act in 1993, and the Help America Vote Act in 2002. These
laws have imposed substantial requirements on states, issuing specific directives to adopt concrete
practices and procedures, such as requiring automatic voter registration at all motor vehicle divisions,
forcing states to accept a standardized federal voter registration form drafted by federal officials,
forcing states to permit “provisional votes” at polling places, requiring them to create a “statewide
computerized voter registration database,” and setting forth detailed requirements for the system
(such as the requirement to “match” a voter registration applicant’s driver’s license number or last
four digits of her social security number with those on file with the state DMV or the federal SSA,
respectively). See generally Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (Supp. II 2002);
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2006).
The constitutionality of Congress’s power to impose these laws has never been seriously challenged,
even though their burdens are huge by comparison.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). Prior to VRARA, section 5’s antidiscrimination standard read:
“does not have the purpose and will not have the effect . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
150. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
151. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1970).
152. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969).
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not disrupted, either all at once or wholesale. Congress specified that the
preclearance regime should reach only changes in voting qualifications,
154
prerequisites, standards, practices or procedures. Existing law and
practices are not subject to preclearance, even if they were established
with discriminatory purpose and are retained with the intent to
155
discriminate. Only a change will trigger section 5 preclearance review.
156
Moreover, after Beer v. United States, the Attorney General may not
object based on the effects prong to any vote changes that improve upon
or replicate the status quo in a different form. Beer interprets the effects
prong narrowly to prohibit only those vote changes that “would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
157
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” The preclearance regime
is, therefore, intrinsically gradualist and incrementalist. It tolerates
variation and experimentation at the local levels—even below nationally
accepted constitutional standards of racial vote discrimination.
The standard account of preclearance is that Congress acted to
prevent jurisdictions from circumventing judicial remedies to racial
158
discrimination. Whereas section 2, authorizing civil rights actions, is
159
called the “sword,” section 5 is called a “shield.” Instead of waiting for
victims to bring civil rights actions for voter discrimination, only to have
offending jurisdictions undo any judicial remedy by subsequently
tinkering with other elements of a complex election system, section 5
declared every election-related change presumptively discriminatory
unless the jurisdiction satisfied its burden of proving that the new law
160
had neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court thus explained that

154. § 1973(c).
155. Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983) (clarifying that changes that are
neither ameliorative nor retrogressive do not violate the section 5 effect standard).
156. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
157. Id. at 141.
158. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Voting Rights Enforcement & Reauthorization: The
Department of Justice’s Record of Enforcing the Temporary Voting Rights Act Provisions 2
(2006) [hereinafter VRA Enforcement Record].
159. See e.g., Heather K. Way, A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the
Argument for the Incorporation of Section 2, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1439, 1453–54 (1996).
160. See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (“There is nothing illogical about
creating a per se ban on certain presumptively discriminatory qualifications in ‘covered jurisdictions’
only . . . .”); Mark A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s Implementation of
Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, as Intended by Congress, 1 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub.
Pol’y 79, 88 (2006) (“This reversal of the ordinary legal presumption is at the heart of the Section 5
remedy.”). But the burden-shifting statute is not properly described as a legal presumption.
Jurisdictions that seek preclearance from the DOJ bear the burden of proving that their voting
changes are nondiscriminatory. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538–39 (1973) (upholding
burden-shifting in administrative preclearance); see also Procedures for the Administration of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005).
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Congress intended to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the
161
perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”
But the standard account is incomplete. Section 5 does not, in fact,
“shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil
to its victims.” It splits the difference. Time and inertia still work in favor
of offending jurisdictions to the extent that the statute does not require
jurisdictions to change their procedures. Covered jurisdictions can avoid
162
preclearance for a time by refraining from vote changes.
Similarly, the section 5 effects test is not as “all-encompassing,
163
stringent, unconditional, and uncompromising,” as is suggested. To
pass muster under section 5, vote changes need not conform to uniform
national standards or best practices. A vote change that is not
purposefully discriminatory must be precleared if it does not make
164
minorities worse off or “retrogress.” For example, a districting plan
that merely retains the number of majority-minority districts but does
not draw additional ones does not necessarily violate section 5, even if it
does not afford minorities proportional representation in the legislature.
An attorney in the DOJ’s Voting Section once put it this way: “If a
change makes something better, we’re not supposed to object even if it is
165
still not very good.”
Objections by the DOJ have predominately based on retrogressive
166
effect (or on a combination of retrogression and other bases). But
critics have suggested that the DOJ’s increased reliance on
discriminatory intent during the 1980s and 1990s was used to impose

161. 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
162. Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and
Language Minorities, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 21, 33; see also Ball et al., supra note 27,
at 179 (During the 1970s and early 1980s, “many counties . . . simply ignored the 1965 Voting Rights
Act by not modifying their election laws or procedures.”). The requirement of reapportionment in
accordance with the decennial census and other legal and internal exigencies of the electoral process
place limits on such a strategy of delay. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After
the 2000 Census, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 733–34 (1998). Furthermore, successful lawsuits against
minority vote discrimination under section 2 force changes that are later subject to preclearance.
Nonetheless, preclearance has been avoided for decades in certain cases. See, e.g., Bartlett v.
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1239 (2009) (considering the “whole county” provision).
163. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 363 (2000) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to
insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”).
165. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 88 (citing the Hunter interview).
166. Posner, supra note 160, at 108 & tbl.2. Posner notes that “[a] small percentage (about nine
percent) of the retrogression objections interposed in the 1980s were based on the analysis developed”
in Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–76 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999
(1978). Posner, supra note 160, at 108 n.92. The Wilkes test, however, “did not measure whether
minority voters in fact would be worse off . . . .” Id.
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rigid federal requirements on state and local jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, persuasive arguments have been advanced to suggest that
the DOJ has been quite flexible and much less intrusive than generally
presumed in its enforcement of both the purpose and the effects prongs
168
of the section 5 standard. For example, the DOJ interposed objections
to over 150 redistricting plans based on discriminatory purpose during
the 1990s. But these objections rested on an interpretation of the purpose
standard that required jurisdictions to provide specific evidence of nondiscriminatory purpose, where a “plan substantially minimized minority
voting strength, and that minimization was not required by adherence to
169
traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . .” In other words, the
Attorney General would defer to, and prioritize, traditional race-neutral
justifications for drawing district lines—even in cases where the
districting plans minimized minority voting strength. Only where the
justification of district boundaries—in terms of incumbency protection,
preserving political subdivisions, geographic compactness, contiguity,
representation of communities of interest, and so on—could not explain
why a jurisdiction had minimized minority voting strength, did the DOJ
insist on further explanation.
Critics complained of this use of section 5 as a tool of affirmative
170
action. But, affirmative action is associated with quotas that are
privileged over—or at least valued the same as—other legitimate
considerations in admissions or hiring, among others. Here,
nonretrogressive changes that minimized minority voting strength would
not prompt an objection under the purpose prong, so long as those
changes could be accounted for reasonably. Consistent with this
approach, the DOJ relied on discriminatory purpose under a few other
circumstances that, in its eyes, delegitimized a jurisdiction’s
nonretrogressive voting change and thus raised questions of intent. The

167. See Maurice T. Cunningham, Maximization, Whatever the Cost: Race, Redistricting, and
the Department of Justice 68 (2000) (“Whereas the DOJ had a history of seeking moderately
progressive legal interpretations, in the nineties it transformed purpose and Gingles in order to push
and defend maximization.”); see also id. at 119–40.
168. See generally Voting Rights Act: Section 5—Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. app. at 96–181 (2005)
[hereinafter Preclearance Hearing] (prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.); Peyton McCrary et
al., The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 275 (2006); Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the
Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Race and Redistricting in the
1990s, at 80, 96–98 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); Posner, supra note 160, at 84; James P. Turner, CaseSpecific Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, in Controversies in Minority Voting, supra note
34, at 296–99. The authors cited here have all been longtime career staff with the DOJ’s Voting
Section.
169. Posner, supra note 160, at 145; Posner, supra note 168, at 101.
170. See, e.g., Thernstrom, supra note 37, at 27 (stating that section 5 has been wrongfully turned
“into an instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere”).
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controversy surrounding the DOJ’s resort to section 5’s discriminatory
intent standard is taken up below.
The preclearance regime was designed to address regional and local
variation in other fundamental ways. The VRA’s unusual coverage
provision singled out the worst offenders by keying coverage to the
abuse of literacy or moral character tests used to keep blacks off the rolls
171
and to the resulting very low registration rates. Southern states
complained that “the coverage formula . . . disregard[ed] various local
172
conditions which have nothing to do with racial discrimination.” The
fact that some Southern states, like Florida, were not covered in their
entirety weakens this criticism. Moreover, additional jurisdictions would
become subject to preclearance based on the trigger. Indeed, the
coverage provision was later amended to include discrimination against
minority language groups. Finally, a bailout provision allowed
jurisdictions to apply for termination of coverage under section 5, if they
173
could prove they had not engaged in racial vote discrimination.
The DOJ’s preclearance procedures developed to accommodate
local variation in exchange for local jurisdictions’ agreement to share
174
The implementation of
information with the federal agency.
preclearance occurred against the background of significant resistance
and defiance by covered jurisdictions and a severely understaffed Voting
175
Section at the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division (“CRD”). The CRD
responded with an enforcement process that rested heavily on informal
exchange, negotiation, and compromise between local governments, the
CRD staff, and the minority groups and representatives who were most
176
affected by vote changes. This approach has been partially credited for
the steady increase of submissions, following the first publication of
177
submissions guidelines in 1971. Hugh Graham, who has studied the
evolution of administrative agencies during this period concluded that
the “CRD never treated the South like Hugo Black’s feared ‘conquered
province.’ Instead, it pre-cleared 95 percent of the 35,000 proposed
electoral changes [as of 1982], objected to only 2.3 percent, and litigated
178
only 240 of the most intractable cases.”

171. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329–34 (1966).
172. Id. at 329.
173. Relatively few jurisdictions took advantage of this provision. See generally Hebert, supra note
90; Herbert, supra note 96.
174. This is one of the features that characterize “democratic experimentalist” institutions,
according to Dorf and Sabel. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26, at 438–44.
175. See Ball et al., supra note 27, at 201–02.
176. Id. at 74–78.
177. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158.
178. Hugh Graham, Book Review, 49 J. S. Hist. 145, 146 (1983) (reviewing Ball et al., supra note
27).
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Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
City of Richmond and Beer endorsed and validated the CRD’s emerging
179
case-specific and flexible administrative process. This is consistent with
criticisms that the preclearance process and the Supreme Court’s
decisions in City of Richmond and Beer failed to implement Congress’s
“stringent, unconditional, and uncompromising” section 5 standard as
180
Because, under Beer, the DOJ’s review is based on
intended.
comparing vote changes to the state or local status quo, the DOJ’s
enforcement of section 5 has necessarily continued to be case-specific:
Under section 5, “a practice that is legal and proper in one jurisdiction
181
may be illegal and improper in another . . . .”
As discussed above, the DOJ’s power to object has been criticized
as akin to giving the federal government a veto, or permitting it to strike
down a state or local law, without having to bring a lawsuit. But this
analogy is misleading. There is no finding of liability under the
preclearance regime. If the DOJ fails to object within sixty days of the
receipt of a submission, the change of law goes into effect. The ultimate
“remedy,” an objection by the Attorney General, is to send the
jurisdiction back to the drawing board. The DOJ has no power to craft
and impose a particular solution on state or local jurisdictions, as does a
182
court in a section 2 case. If a jurisdiction refuses to comply, the DOJ
183
must still go to court to obtain an injunction. Initially, the DOJ did not
even focus on following up to determine whether jurisdictions
184
implemented changes that had been denied preclearance. Given the
very low number of objections—less than 1% of submissions on
average—the principal imposition on covered jurisdictions is the
requirement that they create and produce the information demanded by

179. See infra notes 275–95 for a fuller discussion.
180. See, e.g., Ball et al., supra note 27 (arguing that the DOJ implemented a regime that
“compromised compliance”); Karlan, supra note 3 (deploring the increasingly lenient interpretation
given to section 5’s standard by the U.S. Supreme Court). But see Posner, supra note 160, at 124.
(rejecting Ball’s thesis of “compromised compliance” without, however, specifically addressing
evidence marshaled by Ball and his co-authors). While different in emphasis, I do not believe that
Posner’s showing is inconsistent with Ball’s interpretation of the CRD’s implementation of
administrative preclearance.
181. Turner, supra note 168, at 297; see also Posner, supra note 160, at 127; Posner, supra note 168.
182. To be sure, courts that enter a finding of liability are first required to let the offending
jurisdiction come up with an alternative. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265, 1268 (8th Cir.
1994) (citing Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)). But judicial remedies are not infrequent
under section 2. See generally Katz, supra note 4.
183. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, Section 5 and the Justice Department, in Controversies in Minority
Voting, supra note 34, at 63 n.45. (citing United States v. City of Houston, C.A. No. 78-4-2407 (S.D.
Tex. July 19, 1979)).
184. As of 1978, the Attorney General had objected to 257 of the reported 13,433 submissions
between 1965 and 1976 but had yet to initiate any formal compliance reviews. U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Voting Rights Act—Enforcement Needs Strengthening 17 (1978); Days, supra note 184, at
64.
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the submissions guidelines and any required follow-up requests for
185
information by the Voting Section staff.
Preclearance requires covered jurisdictions to continuously report
all changes in voting-related laws, practices, and procedures, even if no
complaints have been received by the DOJ and no law suits have been
filed in the courts. If the Voting Section is not persuaded that a vote
change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or
membership in a language minority group,” it may either object or seek
further information from the jurisdiction (so-called More Information
186
Requests, or “MIR”). Objections, as already stated, are rare; MIRs are
187
more common.
For these reasons, preclearance has functioned, for the most part, as
a monitoring regime. But, preclearance has not been toothless.
Participants in the process have pointed out that “a denial of
preclearance may result in overturning actions a jurisdiction has already
taken or in suspending changes such as annexations and bond elections
that have enormous economic consequences. At the very least, a denial
188
may promise lengthy and expensive litigation.” But section 5 does not
189
impose additional burdens or legal requirements on jurisdictions. A
federal antidiscrimination norm already applies nationwide to all
jurisdictions under section 2 of the VRA and under the Fourteenth and
190
Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Section 5
does not go beyond what is substantively already required of states and
localities. To the contrary, in making preclearance decisions, the DOJ
was forced to tolerate unconstitutional and, under Bossier Parish II, even
intentional discrimination, so long as it did not make minorities worse

185. Contrast that with the significant success rates for plaintiffs in voting rights litigation. A recent
study by Professor Katz finds that:
Electoral practices implemented by counties in covered jurisdictions have been most
vulnerable to challenge under Section 2, with plaintiffs obtaining favorable outcomes in
55.3% of the suits against county practices since 1982. Practices adopted by schools and by
states as a whole, in covered and noncovered jurisdictions alike, have been more resilient,
with plaintiffs succeeding in 28.6% of the lawsuits brought against these entities.
Katz, supra note 4, at 190–91. These numbers do not include settlements; nor do they include
withdrawals. Id.
186. 28 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2010); id. § 51.37(a).
187. Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, More Information Requests and the Deterrent
Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, supra
note 4, at 47, 60 tbl.3.2 (identifying 2282 objections relative to 387,673 submitted changes but 13,697
MIRs).
188. Days, supra note 184, at 61; see also Posner, supra note 168.
189. Posner, supra note 168.
190. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (2006)); see also U.S. Const. amend XIV; U.S. Const. amend XV.
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191

off. Section 5, as the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions, is
192
Neither
therefore less burdensome than the Constitution itself.
193
194
objections based on the retrogression prong, nor the purpose prong,
imposed requirements that exceeded what the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments already demanded. In any case, the application of the
purpose standard in the administrative preclearance process, is
necessarily much less burdensome to jurisdictions than litigating the
matter.
In sum, preclearance has operated as a regime of forced disclosure,
195
or “information-pushing.” Every election-related change in the law, or
196
in practices and procedures must be precleared. Depending on how
one counts, there have been over 117,000 submissions between 1965 and
197
2004, or 435,000 reviews of voting changes between 1965 and 2006. For
each vote change, covered jurisdictions must make detailed submissions
that are standardized to the requirements of the DOJ guidelines.
Covered jurisdictions must submit detailed information concerning vote
changes, including a copy of the ordinance, enactment, or order;
information concerning the authority enacting the change; an
explanation of the change, including its date, scope, the reasons for the
change, and its impact on minority groups; and a statement of past or
198
pending litigation concerning the change or related voting practices. If
the change is more complex, involving redistricting, annexations, or other
complex changes, additional information is required—including
demographic information based on U.S. Census data, the number of
registered voters for affected areas, estimates of population, census block
data for redistricting, maps, data on election returns, information on
publicity of the changes and participation by local groups in the decision
process, and any other information required by the DOJ to make its
199
assessment.
Information on thousands of jurisdictions is kept in databases at the
200
DOJ. The detailed submissions are public and are made available to

191. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 340 (2000) (weakening the
concept of discriminatory intent under section 5 by requiring that an objection must be founded on
“retrogressive intent,” instead of the stricter constitutional standard set forth in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)); McCrary et al.,
supra note 168, at 288–89.
192. See, e.g., Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004).
193. See discussion infra notes 284–94 and accompanying text.
194. See discussion infra notes 369–96 and accompanying text.
195. The term “information-pushing” was suggested to me by Pam Karlan.
196. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969).
197. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 26.
198. 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (2010).
199. Id. § 51.28.
200. Id. § 51.50 (pertaining to maintenance of records concerning submissions).
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local politicians, minority representatives, and civil rights groups as a
matter of course, as well as to anyone else who requests the
201
information. Governmental and nongovernmental actors routinely
access the DOJ’s current and historical information on election law
202
changes in covered jurisdictions. The information is current and
accurate, because the change of law at issue is described and takes effect
203
only after it is precleared. If, upon review, the DOJ is unsatisfied with
the proffered explanation of the change, it will ask for supplementation
204
of the file. Preclearance submissions produce usable information,
because they are standardized to the requirements set forth by the DOJ
205
in the guidelines.
The contrast with litigation is instructive. A lawsuit enforcing the
prohibition against racial vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA
206
typically produces a voluminous and detailed historical record. But it
takes years to develop that record in the context of a judicial proceeding.
By the time the lawsuit is over, the situation on the ground often has
changed. More importantly, such lawsuits are brought only where a
violation is strong enough to justify the considerable investment required
to bring a case. There are relatively few organizations that engage in such
207
litigation and their resources are limited. Katz’s study of section 2 cases

201. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
28 C.F.R. §§ 51.32–.33, 51.36, 51.38, 51.45 (2010).
202. Id. § 51.50.
203. Id.
204. Id. §§ 51.37, 51.39.
205. Note that the current regulations also require that “submissions should be no longer than is
necessary for the presentation of the appropriate information and materials.” See 28 C.F.R. § 51.26
(2010).
206. Notwithstanding the simplification of vote dilution claims under section 2 by Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), plaintiffs in such cases will make voluminous factual submissions to satisfy
their burden under the totality of circumstances test further specified by the factors listed in the Senate
Report to the 1982 amendments of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which were originally distilled
from case law, specifically White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d
1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and
Minority Representation, in Controversies in Minority Voting, supra note 34, at 68; see also
Issacharoff et al., supra note 62, at 543. In Thornburg v. Gingles, for example, the factual record
before the court supported the court’s finding under
the totality of the circumstances . . . that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy
of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health
services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with
the multimember districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and
politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and
to elect candidates of their choice.
478 U.S. at 80.
207. Most cases are brought by a limited number of civil rights groups. See generally Gregory A.
Caldeira, Litigation, Lobbying, and the Voting Rights Bar, in Controversies in Minority Voting,
supra note 34, 230–57 (arguing that “litigation on voting rights has developed into something of a
cottage industry,” but construing the emerging “voting rights bar” broadly to include non-litigators,
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identified 331 lawsuits, encompassing 763 decisions, since the passage of
the 1982 amendments authorized disparate impact claims under section
208
2. Contrast that with the DOJ’s almost 320,000 voting changes
209
processed since 1982.
Preclearance has taken the form of a relatively informal process of
advisement, assistance, and negotiation between local government
officials and the DOJ on the one hand, and between minority
representatives and (federal and local) public officials on the other hand.
The process promotes learning at several levels, even as it has involved
varying degrees of political and intergovernmental conflict that
occasionally must be settled in Court.
This submission process creates a constant intergovernmental
information exchange regarding thousands of changes in local law or
election procedure each year. DOJ experts analyze the submissions and
communicate about changes with local officials. As already mentioned,
the regulations include record keeping requirements that ensure access
to current and historical information for each of thousands of covered
jurisdictions about every “ordinance, enactment, order, or regulation
embodying a voting practice that [was] proposed to be repealed,
210
The material is accessible to
amended, or otherwise changed.”
government officials, to local minority groups, national civil rights
organizations, minority representatives and office holders, and the
general public. More recently, the regulations have provided for
electronic submissions and standardized electronic coding of
demographic data, maps, census blocks, and so forth, increasingly
211
rendering this information electronically searchable.
The information exchange is a two-way street. Local officials seek
guidance from the DOJ about filing submissions, what changes might

and discussing throughout a small number of “well-established institutions” who have been repeat
players in voting rights litigation, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU National
Voting Rights Project, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the Laywers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law). Additional institutions, such as The Advancement Project
and the Brennan Center for Justice, among others, have recently joined this group.
208. According to Katz’s estimate (based on interpolation from the ACLU’s data concerning
section 2 cases brought in Georgia), more than 1600 section 2 cases have been filed nationwide during
that period, 800 of them in covered jurisdictions. Katz et al., supra note 4, at 654. Katz also notes,
Of the total number of cases filed, some plaintiffs failed to pursue their claims, some
obtained relief through settlement, and others saw their cases go to judgment, but the courts
involved did not issue any published opinion or ancillary ruling published on the electronic
databases surveyed. The total number of claims filed under Section 2 since the 1982
amendment is, accordingly, not known.
Id.
209. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 157, at 31 tbl.A3.
210. 28 C.F.R. § 51.27(b) (2010).
211. Id. § 51.20.
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raise concerns, and how to comply with the preclearance procedures.
DOJ staffers respond by applying precedent from prior preclearance
213
decisions by the federal courts and the DOJ. The requirement to
submit by use of a standardized form, in turn, forces submitting
jurisdictions to consider the federal antidiscrimination norm in their
decision process. This happens at every level of government, because
local jurisdictions must submit directly to the DOJ. Moreover, at least as
important as the assessment itself, it forces the jurisdiction to put
together the information in a manner that permits such consideration in
214
the first place.
The regulations also encourage local jurisdictions to consult and
involve local minority representatives in the preclearance process. For
important or controversial changes, jurisdictions must provide evidence
that the public has been notified of the changes, that residents have had
the opportunity to be heard about the changes, and about the extent of
215
minority participation in the decision process. This encourages local
officials to consult and engage with minority representatives at the local
level and to negotiate with them. The case of Georgia v. Ashcroft is
perhaps exemplary in showing how significant participation by minorities
in the decision process might be deemed more important than DOJ
expert reports in determining whether to preclear complicated and far216
reaching changes. In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court based its decision to
reject the DOJ’s objections to Georgia’s post-2000 redistricting plan on
the extensive input and participation of black legislatures in devising and
approving the plan. In so doing, the Court privileged minority
participation in the decisionmaking process at the state level over an

212. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 146.
213. 28 CFR §§ 51.52, 51.54–.57 (2010). See generally Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, app. at
109–69 (prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.); see also id. at 8 (testimony of Mark A. Posner,
Professor, Am. Univ.) (“The [Justice] Department utilized the well-established framework for
conducting discriminatory purpose analyses set forth by the Supreme Court in the Arlington Heights
case and also relied on the analytic factors described in the Department’s procedures for the
administration of section 5.”).
214. Ball and his co-authors note:
The importance of initial campaigns to educate subnational officials should not be
overlooked. . . . [It is a key to creating] a common language . . . . [T]he content of
submissions, the form of communications from local groups, and the basic appeal routes
were specified. Such elementary steps often seem rather simple when compared to grander
events like a pivotal Supreme Court case . . . or a long-running enforcement struggle . . . but
without a standard linguistic code and standard operational procedures, neither the
negotiations necessary for inducing compliance nor the procedural fairness necessary for
ensuring obedience can be achieved.
Ball et al., supra note 27, at 117.
215. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7-(7) (1971); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (1987).
216. 539 U.S. 461, 469–72 (2003).
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objective test for retrogression in the redistricting context that had
217
previously been applied by the courts.
The regulations also required submissions to identify and include
contact information for individuals of minority groups residing in the
affected areas “who can be expected to be familiar with the proposed
218
change or who have been active in the political process.” The DOJ
maintained a file with contact information for local and regional minority
219
representatives, minority leaders, and civil rights organizations.
Finally, the preclearance regime has relied heavily on enlisting local
knowledge in the various ways described above. Instead of overriding
local preferences, choices remain in local hands. Changes are identified
and justified by local officials, who are charged with getting input at the
local level from affected minorities. Self-interested local minority
representatives and civil rights groups are relied upon at various stages in
the process: to comment at the local level on the effects of the changes
before their adoption, to flag problematic changes for the Voting Section
staff, to raise objections with the Voting Section, and to contribute
220
information on the effects of submissions during the review process. In
addition, they help identify unreported changes, which would otherwise
221
go unnoticed.
C. Phases of Implementation
It is helpful to consider these features of the preclearance regime in
connection with the different phases of the VRA’s implementation. The
following distinguishes five phases: (1) the focus on registration during
the 1960s, (2) the implementation of preclearance as a process of
bargaining and compromise in the 1970s, (3) the relative impact of
litigation and the evolution of vote dilution claims during the 1970s and
1980s, (4) the focus on redistricting during the 1990s and the Supreme
Court’s Shaw jurisprudence, and (5) the evolution of the nonretrogression
standard during the post-Shaw period.
1.

The Focus on Registration During the 1960s

The first phase focused on voter registration in the South. The VRA
mandated that literacy tests and poll taxes be abolished in covered
jurisdictions and gave the Attorney General the authority to send federal

217. Id.; see discussion infra notes 406–26 and accompanying text.
218. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (2010).
219. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., infra notes 402–03 and accompanying text for criticism of the DOJ’s Voting Section
for relying too heavily on civil rights groups in this process.
221. The reliance on local minority groups has led to arguments of administrative capture. See
Cunningham, supra note 167, at 94–97.
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marshals and examiners or observers to covered jurisdictions. During
the 1960s, black voter registration ratios rose from 29% to 60% as a
223
result of these and other factors. Both the elimination of literacy tests
and the dispatch of county-level federal examiners had a significant
224
impact.
That initial phase, which involved a significant and direct
interference with the police powers of covered jurisdictions, came to an
225
end in the late 1960s. Faced with attempts to roll back gains in black
registration by instituting re-registration programs in the late 1960s, the
DOJ began to focus on section 5, which had been enacted to preclude
precisely these attempts at undermining progress in minority vote
discrimination.
2.

The Implementation of the Preclearance Regime as a Process of
Bargaining and Compromise in the 1970s

Compliance with preclearance was sporadic in the late 1960s. There
was uncertainty about what changes were subject to preclearance until
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Allen v. State Board of Elections that
section 5 reached a broad range of election-related changes, including
226
racial vote dilution. Allen changed the situation dramatically. Allen
involved the change to at-large elections of all county boards of
227
The changes
supervisors and boards of election in Mississippi.
228
threatened to significantly dilute black voting strength. Voting rights
activists brought suit, arguing that these changes were subject to
229
preclearance. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed, holding that the
VRA “gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that
230
voting includes ‘all action necessary to make a vote effective.’” Not
merely registration procedures, but all laws affecting voting would
thereafter require preclearance, including annexations, districting, and
231
the use of at-large voting to dilute minority voting strength.

222. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, §§ 4, 6, 79 Stat. 437, 438–40 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
223. Davidson & Grofman, supra note 4, at 366.
224. Id. at 367.
225. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 73.
226. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
227. Id. at 550.
228. Davidson, supra note 162, at 32.
229. Allen, 393 U.S. at 554.
230. Id. at 565–66 (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 4(c)(2), 79 Stat. 437,
439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (1964 & Supp I)).
231. See supra text accompanying note 68. See generally Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502
U.S. 491, 502–03 (1992); Allen, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Ball et al., supra note 27, at 19, 66–67.
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232

In 1970, Congress renewed section 5. In 1971, the DOJ published
233
guidelines that detailed the submission requirements and process.
Submissions increased substantially from 1542 between 1965 and 1974, to
13,874 between 1975 and 1981, even as the percentage of objections fell
234
steeply during the same periods (from 14.2% to 3.1%).
Preclearance had to be initiated in a context of conflict, mistrust,
235
and absence of respect between federal and state actors. The DOJ’s
236
CRD did not have enough staff to fully review all the vote changes.
Lacking judicial powers, the CRD had to seek injunctions in court to
force a submission or enforce an objection. And it did not have the
capability to identify voting changes down to the county, city, and school
237
board levels for thousands of jurisdictions in the first place. The CRD
depended on the regulated entities to come forward and participate in
the compliance process voluntarily and on assistance from increasingly
238
important civil rights organizations. In the face these challenges, the
DOJ adopted a more flexible strategy of information exchange and
negotiation. In the words of one DOJ official, the CRD handled
submissions by “establishing a mutually acceptable set of objectives and
values and accommodating these to the solution of the problems of
239
different political constituencies.”
A study by Howard Ball, Dale Krane, and Thomas P. Lauth
documents that the CRD assumed the role of mediator and educator:
In order to elicit compliance, the Voting Section had to overcome its
inherent administrative weaknesses and had to build working
relationships with southern election officials and southern civil rights
leaders. Ultimately, to prevent the racial conflict from swamping its
limited regulatory capacities, the only feasible approach to
enforcement rested on the ability and ingenuity of the CRD attorneys

232. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 2.
233. See discussion infra note 241.
234. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 26 tbl.4 (periods correspond to legislative
changes).
235. See Ball et al., supra note 27, at 115.
236. See id. at 116–17; VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 24 (“The Justice Department
does not have the capacity to monitor all the covered jurisdictions to ensure that all voting changes are
precleared prior to implementation.”). Jurisdictions originally covered by the 1965 Act
include[d] approximately 550 counties and several thousand cities, towns, villages, and other
special districts. From the viewpoint of the Voting Section, the logistics of enforcement pose
a nearly insurmountable task because the relatively small staff of the Submission Unit
located in Washington, D.C., must monitor the actions of elected officials (in often isolated
communities) throughout the Deep South without the aid of their own field personnel.
Ball et al., supra note 27, at 80–81.
237. Days, supra note 184, at 60–61. In spite of computerization, even today the identification of
changes is not a straightforward matter because of the decentralization of the election system.
238. See Lorn S. Foster, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Implementation of an Administrative
Remedy, 16 Publius: J. Federalism 17, 23 (1986).
239. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 116 (internal citations omitted).
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to bring together the local contenders and to strike a bargained voting
change between the two sides, which could then be “precleared” by the
Attorney General. Despite its poverty of compliance-inducing
resources, the Voting Section has been able to develop and implement
240
such a bargaining strategy.

The negotiation strategy of the CRD is evidenced by the 1971
241
regulations. The regulations forced information sharing between, and
participation by, local jurisdictions, the DOJ, affected minorities, and
242
their local representatives. Submissions were to include “evidence of
243
public notice, of opportunity for the public to be heard[.]” The
regulations strongly encouraged submission of newspaper articles,
broadcast and television notices, minutes of public meetings or hearings,
244
and pertinent minority group contacts. In considering submissions,
“substantial weight” would be given
to evidence of public notice or, where appropriate, opportunity for
interested parties to participate in the decision to adopt or implement
the proposed change and to indications that such participation in fact
took place or to evidence of notice to the public that a submission has
245
been made soliciting comment to the Department of Justice.

In effect, the administrative agency outsourced part of the administrative
process to local jurisdictions. The study concluded that “[d]espite the
resistance of die-hard segregationists and the absence of financial
incentives of most other federal programs, voting rights policy
implementation has tended to be a form of intergovernmental relations
and interorganizational communications characterized more by
246
cooperation than conflict.” Even as Drew Days rejected the study’s
suggestion “that the Justice Department negotiate[d] with covered
jurisdictions from a position of weakness,” he admitted that “[t]he
department’s response to the technical-legal problems [of monitoring
and compliance] has been to rely primarily on negotiation with
247
submitting jurisdictions rather than on coercive measures.”

240. Id.
241. The proposed guidelines were first published for comment in the Federal Register.
Administration of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. 9781 (May 28, 1971). They were then
published in final form and have been codified since 1972. Procedures for the Administration of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. 18186 (Sept. 10, 1971) (codified at 28 C.F.R
pt. 51 (1972)). The regulations governing the preclearance process have not changed significantly since
the original codification. See 28 C.F.R pt. 51 (2010).
242. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51; Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 36 Fed. Reg. at 18186; Administration of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. at 9781.
243. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28(f) (2010); Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. at 18186; Administration of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg.
at 9781.
244. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28(f).
245. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7-(7) (1971); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.28(f) (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (1987).
246. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 28–29.
247. Days, supra note 184, at 61.

Halberstam-62-HLJ-923 (Do Not Delete)

March 2011]

4/28/2011 12:21 PM

THE MYTH OF “CONQUERED PROVINCES”

963

A covered jurisdiction was required to submit to the CRD the law it
sought to repeal or amend, together with a statement of the reasons for
248
the change. An explanation of the difference between the submitted
change and the existing law or practice was required, including a
statement of the anticipated effect of the change on members of racial or
249
minority groups. Pending litigation relating to the change must be
250
disclosed. Redistrictings, annexations, and other boundary changes
required additional demographic information on how the proposal would
change the boundaries of the voting unit or units and details concerning
the effects this would have on the total and voting-age population by race
251
and language group. The submission of additional information might
be required in response to MIRs from the Voting Section’s attorneys. As
part of the review process, the developed submission file was made
252
available to local interest groups and politicians for input. All these
provisions are substantially retained in the current version of the
253
guidelines.
Separately, the regulations have explicitly required the Voting
Section to obtain information from local minorities and civil rights
254
groups through unofficial channels of communication. The submitting
jurisdiction has had to identify and include contact information for
individuals of minority groups residing in the affected areas “who can be
expected to be familiar with the proposed change or who have been
255
active in the political process.” Such informants have been encouraged
directly by Voting Section staff to submit information not only
concerning pending submissions, but also concerning vote changes that
256
have not been reported to the Voting Section.
The following is a description of the section 5 review process by
Mark Posner, who was an attorney with the CRD from 1980 to 2003:
Because the Justice Department must review submitted changes
within a limited time period, the Department utilizes a relatively
informal process for conducting the Section 5 reviews. As specified in
the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5, jurisdictions
initiate the administrative process by sending a letter to the Voting
Section identifying the voting changes at issue and providing certain
background data and documentation. The Section then conducts a
factual investigation by examining the written information provided by
the jurisdiction and requesting additional written information from the

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

28 C.F.R. § 50.7-(10) (1971).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 50.7.
See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2010).
28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1971); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. D (2010).
28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1971); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. D (2010).
28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1971); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. D (2010).
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jurisdiction when appropriate, reviewing any written information
provided by others, speaking on the telephone with the jurisdiction’s
representatives and with minority contacts and other interested
citizens, occasionally conducting an in-person meeting in Washington,
D.C. with the jurisdiction’s representatives or separately with other
interested individuals, and considering information on file with the
Section (such as census data or information located in old submission
257
files).

Such ex parte communications would, of course, be prohibited in judicial
proceedings. The informality of the review process was also in other
respects very different from a judicial proceeding and more like
alternative dispute resolution:
The Department does not conduct formal or informal hearings, does
not require or encourage the presentation of testimony under oath
through affidavits or declarations, and does not have the authority to
subpoena documents. The Department also does not apply the Federal
Rules of Evidence to the information received during the course of its
258
reviews.

The CRD’s strategy of informal negotiation and compromise in
exchange for cooperative disclosure emerged in the context of significant
pressure on the DOJ by the Nixon administration, which sought to kill
259
the VRA. Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” involved withdrawing federal
260
officials from the South. The new Attorney General, John Mitchell,
insisted that the CRD limit its objections under section 5 to only those
261
instances in which it saw clear cases of racial discrimination. Civil rights
lawyers believed that during the early years of the Nixon administration,
the CRD’s actual practices removed the burden on submitting
jurisdictions by requiring that either the department or interested private
parties develop evidence that the proposed change would be iniquitous
262
to blacks.
Voting rights supporters and independent observers viewed the
process that emerged as one of “compromised compliance,” in which the
263
CRD settled for “suboptimal levels of compliance.” Drew Days, who
served as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under President
Carter from 1977 to 1980, and as President Clinton’s Solicitor General
from 1993 to 1996, conceded that the Voting Section largely relied on

257. Posner assisted in supervising the CRD’s section 5 preclearance review from the mid-1980s to
1995. Mark A. Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act: Is It a Problem and What Should Congress Do? 9 (2006).
258. Id.
259. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 67–70.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. David Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, at 198 (1978).
263. See generally Ball et al., supra note 27.
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voluntary compliance by covered jurisdictions, even as it prosecuted a
264
number of significant voting changes.
Several other factors, some at cross-purposes, contributed to the
CRD’s implementation of the new preclearance strategy. Nixon
265
reorganized the DOJ in 1969, during his first year in office. The change
was consistent with Nixon’s stated desire to ensure that the young liberal
lawyers in the CRD would be prevented from running wild through the
South, enforcing compliance with extreme or punitive requirements they
266
had formulated in Washington, D.C. But the shift from regional to
functional assignments led to the creation of the Voting Section in the
CRD, whose staff was committed to voting rights and developed an
267
expertise in preclearance. Nixon’s attempt to kill section 5 aroused
268
resistance, and Congress passed the 1970 Amendments to the Act.
Once it was clear that section 5 would now be enforced, conservatives in
the South asked the administration for guidelines and procedures for
269
section 5 preclearance. Finally, civil rights groups were spreading in the
South and were becoming much more powerful regionally and in their
influence on Congress.
Far from dealing with covered jurisdictions with an iron fist, the
preclearance procedures emerged in a context of significant challenges to
the federal enforcement of civil rights during the 1970s and were shaped
by compromise. Indeed, “[t]he strongest demands for regulations came
from conservative southern lawyers who had to comply with the Act but
did not know how to comply because there were no preclearance
270
procedures in existence.” The new preclearance regime can hardly be
said to have represented the intensification of DOJ intervention. It
emerged during the early years of the Nixon administration, in a political
climate much less punitive of Southern institutions of racism and
segregation than the period immediately following the protest at
271
Selma. In fact, civil rights activists were concerned during this period
about a retrenchment by Southern jurisdictions, and viewed the DOJ’s

264. Days, supra note 184, at 64.
265. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 68.
266. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon 440 (1978).
267. Posner notes that the delegation of the preclearance decision (but not the decision to
interpose objections) to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2005), and the further
delegation of a large portion of the decisional authority to knowledgeable, committed, expert career
government employees in the Voting Section, 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2004), were perhaps the most
important provisions in the section 5 procedures. Posner, supra note 160, at 98–99.
268. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(2006)).
269. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 72.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Kousser, supra note 64, at 686–87 (2008).
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implementation of section 5 as part and parcel of the federal government’s
272
greater leniency.
A different explanation for the preclearance’s informal, dialogic
enforcement process has been advanced by historians who have
described the rise of an administrative model of civil rights reform in the
273
1960s with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the VRA of 1965. The
implementation of the preclearance regime can be seen as part of a
broader historical shift away from a tort-based model of civil rights
enforcement in the courts, resulting in a fundamental transformation of
social regulation. Instead of assigning liability, the new focus was on
compliance. Instead of identifying and prosecuting civil rights violations,
the new administrative regime imposed strict liability. The adversarial
relation between civil plaintiffs or government prosecutors on the one
hand, and defendant jurisdictions on the other gave way to less formal
274
administrative procedures that were more dialogic.
275
the Supreme Court
In City of Richmond v. United States,
essentially validated the DOJ’s enforcement strategy. The case involved
a land annexation by Richmond, Virginia that decreased the black
276
population from 52% to 42%. The DOJ had interposed an objection to
an earlier annexation plan in 1971 but subsequently negotiated a
277
compromise with the city. Richmond would be permitted to go ahead
with the annexation, so long as it dropped its plan to adopt at-large
278
elections. The city and the DOJ together sought entry of a consent
decree that would approve an enlarged nine-ward city in which four
wards were predominantly white, four were predominantly black, and
279
one was three-fifths white and two-fifths black. The district court
refused to issue the consent judgment, because it felt that the new plan
280
diluted black voting strength. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
question presented was whether the annexation plan had either the
281
purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further
282
consideration. It held that, assuming it could be established after
further proceedings that the annexation had no discriminatory purpose,
section 5 could be satisfied if Richmond created an electoral system that

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
See generally Graham, supra note 34, at 179.
Id.
422 U.S. 358 (1975).
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363–64, 366.
See id. at 366.
Id.
Id. at 366–67.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 379.
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afforded blacks “representation reasonably equivalent to their political
283
strength in the enlarged community.” City of Richmond has been
interpreted as a victory for the DOJ’s bargaining-compromise approach
284
But it also vitiated the “effects” standard in
to preclearance.
annexation cases, and imposed on the Attorney General the difficult
burden of proving discriminatory purpose in order to prevent the
285
dilution of minority political voting strength by annexation.
Under section 5, a covered jurisdiction had to prove to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General, that the new “voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting . . . does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
286
vote on account of race or color.” Both purpose and effect under
section 5 were given special meanings by the Supreme Court, making the
enforcement of section 5 more difficult and lowering the bar for local
jurisdictions.
In Beer v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the effects
287
prong. It held that the purpose of section 5 had always been that “no
voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
288
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” In Beer, the District Court
for the District of Columbia declared a redistricting plan for New
Orleans municipal elections to be in violation of section 5 because the
289
plan failed to justify New Orleans’s retention of two at-large seats. The
redistricting plan, however, did improve minority prospects overall as
compared to the 1961 plan previously in effect. Under the 1961 plan,
none of the five councilman districts had a clear black majority of
registered voters, and no black had been elected to the New Orleans City
290
Council while the plan was in effect. By contrast, under the new plan—

283. Id. at 370.
284. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 100 (“Working together, the city officials and the federal
regulators had worked out an agreement that might have pleased municipal managers but greatly
displeased civil rights supporters. And the message was fairly clear to those city managers who were
not overly enthusiastic about the Voting Rights Act: dilution of black voting strength was possible
through annexation if the manager and his city attorneys, working with the DOJ, could develop a
nonracial, that is, economic, administrative, etc., justification for the enlargement of a city that might
be approaching a situation where a black voting majority could materialize.”).
285. Days, supra note 184, at 56.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). The statute was revised by section 5 of the VRARA. Fannie Lou
Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006))
(striking “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect” and inserting “neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect”).
287. 425 U.S. 130, 139–40 (1976).
288. Id. at 141.
289. Id. at 137–38.
290. Id. at 135.
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to which both the CRD and the court objected—blacks constituted a
majority of the population in two of the five districts and a clear majority
291
of the registered voters in one of them. The new plan therefore
represented a considerable improvement in minority access to
representation, although it did not cure minority vote dilution. The
292
Supreme Court held that this was all that section 5 required. By way of
justification the Court cited the legislative history of the VRA in South
293
Carolina v. Katzenbach, and Justice Brennan’s dissent in City of
294
Richmond v. United States, explaining that the VRA was enacted
because “Congress desired to prevent States from ‘undo[ing] or
defeat[ing] the rights recently won’ by Negroes,” but not to perfect those
295
rights.
3.

The Relative Impact of Litigation, and the Evolution of Vote
Dilution Claims During the 1970s and 1980s

Objections to the preclearance regime have been directed at
transferring court-based authority to an administrative agency and, in
particular, to an executive agency vulnerable to partisanship and
296
ideology. The implication was that the Attorney General now had all
the powers of a federal court, but none of the constraints, given the more
limited procedural safeguards and the absence of a presumptively neutral
297
judge. Depending on the administration in power, the Attorney
General’s significant discretion had the potential for underenforcement,
as claimed by voting rights advocates in the 1970s and 1980s and again
298
during the Bush II administration, or for overreaching, as repeatedly
299
charged by conservative critics, especially in the 1990s.
There is general agreement among historians that the preclearance
process was an informal, pragmatic, dialogic process that applied a
relatively lenient retrogression rule in case-by-case assessments in the
300
1970s and 1980s. The DOJ’s preclearance policies in the 1990s,
however, have been more controversial. During the 1980s, laws on

291. Id. at 135–38.
292. Id. at 140–41.
293. Id. at 140 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)).
294. Id. at 141 n.12 (citing City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 359, 388 (1974)).
295. Id. at 140 (citing and quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-397, at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3284).
296. Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in 1965 stressed the partisan dangers of
assigning preclearance to the DOJ. Kousser, supra note 64, at 688 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 46
(1965)).
297. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 95.
298. Posner, supra note 257, at 2.
299. See generally Cunningham, supra note 167.
300. See generally Ball et al., supra note 27; Cunningham, supra note 167; Graham, supra note
34.
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majority-minority districting changed and the accuracy of computerized
districting—right down to the census block level—made both partisan
manipulation and racially sensitive districting inescapable in the 1990s
301
redistricting round. Critics of the DOJ have argued that civil rights
advocates captured the Voting Section in the 1990s, and that the CRD
implemented an inflexible strategy of maximizing majority-minority
302
districts during this period. This specific charge of “maximization” will
be addressed in the following Part.
A comprehensive study concludes that throughout the 1970s and
1980s, jurisdictions rarely switched from at-large to district elections
303
304
voluntarily. These changes were largely due to litigation. In contrast,
305
“[t]he reach of section 5 in protecting against dilution was limited . . . .”
These findings contradict the critics who charge that preclearance has
been far more intrusive than other enforcement regimes, echoing Justice
Powell’s rather shrill warning that section 5 “destroys local control of the
means of self-government” and “strips locally elected officials of their
306
autonomy to chart policy.” This view cannot be maintained. Indeed,
the DOJ could never do anything but enforce the law as it was written by
Congress and interpreted by the Supreme Court. What had changed
during the 1980s was the national political culture. Congress and the
Supreme Court had accepted majority-minority districts as a necessary
remedy for minority vote dilution, even as the measure produced
307
significant controversy.
The submission process was undoubtedly much less onerous than
litigation. Indeed, the initial proposal of section 5 before Congress did
not provide for administrative preclearance but required that, in every
case, jurisdictions seek a declaratory judgment from the district court in
308
D.C. The administrative preclearance procedure was intended to
309
as administrative
lighten the burden on covered jurisdictions,

301. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 148 (“Technology presented a revolutionary capacity to
aggregate minority populations in previously unthinkable manners.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1726 (1993) (“Technology has
largely marginalized the substantive impact of one-person, one-vote.”).
302. See generally Cunningham, supra note 167 (making the case); Ellen Katz, supra note 78
(describing the Supreme Court’s increasing suspicion of the Voting Section’s preclearance decisions).
303. Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 56; Laughlin
McDonald et al., Georgia, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 99–100.
304. Davidson, supra note 162.
305. Id.
306. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201–02 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
307. Karlan, supra note 301 at 1738–39.
308. Posner, supra note 257, at 6–7. See generally Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, app. at 106
(prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.) (“Preclearance review by the Department provides a
quicker and less expensive alternative to litigation and the Department seeks to function as a
‘surrogate’ for the District of Columbia trial courts.”).
309. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1976) (noting that the availability of expeditious
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preclearance is far more informal, expeditious, and economical than a
310
court action for declaratory judgment. The mere fact that covered
jurisdictions have sought preclearance from the court in only the rarest
311
of cases is telling. Since 1965, the DOJ has reviewed over 435,000
voting changes, while only sixty-eight declaratory judgment actions have
312
Covered jurisdictions approach preclearance as an
been filed.
administrative matter. They do not treat it like litigation, and they
313
frequently rely on administrative personnel to process the submission.
There is thus no doubt that administrative preclearance is “substantially
314
faster, simpler, and cheaper” than a declaratory judgment action.
Regardless, the Attorney General’s determinations must conform to
the determinations reached in the federal courts. As already noted,
preclearance did not impose any additional legal requirements on
redistrictings, annexations, voter registration procedures, or ballot access
315
rules other than those guaranteed by the Constitution. To the contrary,
the retrogression standard lowered the bar.
It was the persistent litigation by civil rights groups under section 2
of the VRA that would establish and refine a new standard for racial
vote dilution. These lawsuits forced the creation of majority-minority
316
districts and led to significant increases in minority representation.
Section 2 of the VRA was not one of the key provisions of the original
317
Act. In 1982, Congress amended section 2 to adopt an explicit results
318
standard, and in so doing adopted the standards for minority vote
dilution that the Court had recognized in White v. Regester, after many
years of litigation by the voting rights bar.
In White v. Regester, the Supreme Court, for the first time, found
that minority vote dilution through the use of at-large elections had been
319
proven. White struck down multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar
preclearance rulings is central to the section 5 scheme, and that degrading this feature would
substantially increase the severity of the section 5 remedy); see also Posner, supra note 257, at 17.
310. Posner, supra note 257, at 6.
311. See Days, supra note 184, at 53 n.2 (noting that, while the DOJ reviewed over 188,000 changes
between 1965 and 1991, only twenty jurisdictions sought judicial preclearance between 1965 and 1969).
312. Posner, supra note 257, at 6.
313. Id.
314. Id.; see also Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy 106 (2006) (estimating that South Carolina
spends less than $500 on each preclearance request); Tokaji, supra note 64, at 795–97.
315. See supra notes 148–65 and accompanying text.
316. Davidson, supra note 162, at 32–36.
317. Id.; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1964 & Supp. I)).
318. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973(b)(f)(2) of this
title, as provided in subsection (b) . . . .”).
319. 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
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Counties, Texas, based on its examination of a “laundry list” of factors
that pointed to the use of multi-member districts as discriminatory or as
321
enhancing the opportunity for discrimination. The White majority
concluded that, based on its examination of the “totality of
circumstances,” blacks and Mexican-Americans “had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political
322
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” In Zimmer v.
McKeithen, the Fifth Circuit refined the standard by systematizing the
323
factors and giving them additional analytic content. The White/Zimmer
test demanded an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the local plan and the maintenance of the local voting
practices, the history of past racial discrimination in the community,
whether alternative practices would give minorities a better chance to
elect candidates of their choice, whether racial groups tended to vote in
blocs, and whether minorities had previously been elected to office, in
324
addition to other factors.
The White/Zimmer factors provided plaintiffs in voting rights cases
with a roadmap for bringing vote dilution cases. Despite the heavy
burden of proof, plaintiffs filed at least forty constitutional challenges to
at-large election schemes throughout the covered states between 1973
325
and 1980.
In 1980, however, to the great consternation of the voting rights bar
and the civil rights community, the Supreme Court struck a blow to this
326
litigation strategy. Following its 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis,
requiring plaintiffs claiming race discrimination under the Equal
327
Protection Clause to show discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court
held in City of Mobile v. Bolden that plaintiffs bringing racial vote
328
dilution claims also had to show discriminatory intent. The passage of
320. Davidson, supra note 162, at 28.
321. 412 U.S. at 769.
322. Id. at 766.
323. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
324. Id. (“[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates,
the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying
the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in
general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is
enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates from running from particular
geographical subdistricts. . . . [A]ll these factors need not be proved in order to obtain relief.”).
325. Davidson, supra note 162, at 28.
326. Armand Derfner called the decision “devastating. Dilution cases came to a virtual standstill;
existing cases were overturned and dismissed while plans for new cases were abandoned.” Armand
Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in Minority Vote Dilution
149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989).
327. 426 U.S. 229, 239–45 (1976).
328. 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (“[O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

Halberstam-62-HLJ-923 (Do Not Delete)

972

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/28/2011 12:21 PM

[Vol. 62:923

the 1982 amendments reversed the Supreme Court’s intent requirement,
reinstated a multifactor test, and adopted a results standard. Henceforth,
racial vote discrimination would be:
[E]stablished if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that
the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation [by members
of a protected racial or language minority] in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
329
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

Construing amended section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, the
Supreme Court substantially streamlined the evidentiary requirements
330
for minority plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in Gingles challenged the dilutive
effect of multi-member districts in North Carolina’s 1981 legislative plan
and sought relief in the form of single-member majority-minority
331
districts. The Gingles Court identified three criteria for claims of atlarge dilutionary effects: (1) that the minority group “is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district”; (2) that the minority group is “politically cohesive”; and (3) that
“the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to
332
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” A minority plaintiff’s case
would depend on showing sufficient levels of racial bloc voting and
establishing that a reasonably compact majority-minority district could
be drawn to afford members of the minority group the ability to elect a
333
candidate of their choice. Only then would the Court proceed to the
“intensely local appraisal” contemplated by the White/Zimmer totality of
334
circumstances inquiry.
At-large elections all but disappeared in covered jurisdictions. A
remarkable shift to single-member districts with majority-minority
districts occurred, driven, for the most part, by litigation. Alabama
presents an illustrative case. An empirical study shows that forty-two of
forty-eight Alabama cities with a population equal to or greater than
6000 switched from at-large elections to district-based elections or a
335
mixed plan. The study concludes that “[l]itigation was the principal
cause of these changes, accounting for 26 of the new district systems and
336
1 of the shifts to a mixed plan[.]” Whereas the preclearance process
“was sometimes the cause of changes to district elections in
Alabama[,] . . . . [i]n most jurisdictions[,] . . . the principal means of

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 48–51.
Id.; see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994).
478 U.S. at 78.
McCrary et al., supra note 303, at 55.
Id.
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337

securing equitable election plans was through litigation.” The authors
note that the preclearance requirements did, however, “serve at least an
338
educational function” in cases that appeared purely voluntary. The
relative impact of litigation on the abandonment of discriminatory at339
large voting systems is similar in the other southern states.
These developments show that the CRD was far less coercive in
forcing majority/minority districts on covered jurisdictions than litigation,
even as critics generally maintained that preclearance was far more
intrusive. Rather, the CRD followed determinations by the federal
340
courts. As the federal courts began to recognize vote dilution challenges
to at-large election systems in jurisdictions with evidence of raciallypolarized voting and of a history of racial discrimination, the CRD
increasingly objected to those plans as well. Similarly, when, as a result of
Thornburg v. Gingles, section 2 was interpreted to require additional
majority-minority districts as a remedy for minority vote dilution, the
CRD became more insistent on the creation of additional majorityminority districts when reviewing submissions in the preclearance
341
process.
If anything, the switch in covered jurisdictions from at-large to
district-based election systems during the 1980s resulted in fewer
objections. As noted by Posner, “A significant percentage of the
Department’s Section 5 objections historically have been directed at
election changes that generally are discriminatory only in the context of
at-large elections (majority vote requirements, anti-single-shot voting
342
provisions, and annexations).” A switch to districting rendered many of
these issues moot. Indeed, the number of objections significantly

337. Id. at 48.
338. Id. at 55 n.146.
339. McDonald, supra note 303, at 78 (“Seventy-seven law suits were filed against the surveyed
jurisdictions alone, challenging at-large elections under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, the
preclearance provisions of section 5, and amended section 2. While the Justice Department played a
key role in the enforcement of section 5, virtually all of the litigation challenging election structures
was brought by civil rights organizations on behalf of the minority community.”). As McDonald notes,
“Section 5 has successfully blocked the introduction of many new attempts at vote dilution. Section 2,
since its amendment in 1982, has proved a potent force in challenging existing discriminatory
practices.” Id. at 90.
340. Turner, supra note 168, at 296–99.
341. See Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, app. at 133–34 (prepared testimony of Peyton
McCrary et al.) (“During the 1970’s, at-large elections and enhancing devices together were denied
preclearance 292 times, 59 percent of all objectionable changes, but only 86 redistricting plans (17
percent) were the subject of objections . . . . By the 1980s, the picture . . . is more mixed: the
Department interposed objections to 150 at-large election plans and enhancing devices (35 percent of
objectionable changes) and denied preclearance to 165 redistricting plans (16 percent). In the 1990s,
at-large elections and enhancing devices were the subject of objections only 104 times, 26 percent of
objectionable changes, but the Department denied preclearance to a striking 209 redistricting plans
(52 percent)—over half of all changes to which objections were interposed . . . .”).
342. Posner, supra note 168, at 15 n.28.
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declined in the 1980s, even as the number of submissions increased
dramatically.
Finally, the open antidiscrimination standard governing
preclearance determinations evolved as voting rights law evolved.
Preclearance did not take place in an institutional vacuum. It was guided
by the developments in the federal courts. Two social scientists have
described this institutional capacity for innovation as follows:
Because the Voting Rights Act does not formulate specific tests for
vote dilution, the meaning of that concept has been the topic of
continuous case-by-case adjudication, while at the same time there has
been an ongoing evolution of administrative standards within the
Voting Section of the Justice Department. The interpretation of the
Act has involved a remarkable sequence of interactions, leading
perhaps to a kind of ‘reflective equilibrium’ in which social scientists’
courtroom testimony in voting rights cases in the 70s and late 60s
influences judicial interpretation of the statute, which in turn set the
stage for law review articles and further social science testimony in the
1980s on the proper interpretation of terms such as ‘racially polarized
voting” culminating in [Thornburg v. Gingles], which in turn becomes
343
the basis for subsequent lower court decisions.

In other words, the evolving preclearance standards fed into, and
reflected, the evolution of standards nationwide, particularly in the more
complicated area of racial vote dilution. The increasingly accurate tests
for racial vote dilution naturally influenced the review of submissions
and submission requirements.
4.

The Focus on Redistricting During the 1990s and the Supreme
Court’s Shaw Jurisprudence

Congress effectively issued a mandate to create majority-minority
344
districts to remedy vote dilution in the 1982 amendments to section 2.
But the statute was approved in the Senate with the proviso that
“[n]othing in this Section shall be read to guarantee the election of
minority group representatives in proportion to the minority group’s
345
This created a conceptual difficulty, as
share of population.”
proportionality was the most obvious measure of fair representation and
the natural stopping-point for drawing additional majority-minority
346
districts. Section 2, however, provides that “nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in

343. Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in
Controversies in Minority Voting, supra note 34, at 197, 223–24.
344. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
345. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
346. Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Righs Act: A
Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1392 (1983).
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numbers equal to their proportions in the population.” This language
codified the considerable ambivalence and distaste for majority-minority
348
districts on the part of conservatives. Majority-minority districts have
been a major focus of controversy about the VRA ever since.
Majority-minority districts have produced cross-cutting allegiances.
Political strategists for the Republican National Party eager to pack
black (predominantly Democratic) voters into highly concentrated
districts sided with the ACLU and other civil rights organizations in
349
advocating for maximizing majority-minority districts. There are many
empirical studies that show majority-minority districts cost Democrats
350
seats Congress in 1992 and 1994. Majority-minority districts have
further offended conservative opponents of affirmative action and have
351
troubled academics concerned about competitive elections. Moreover
majority-minority districts involve trade-offs concerning minority voice
and integration. Like democracy itself, however, majority-minority
districts may be the best of many less-than-ideal choices for improving
access to the political process.
During the 1990s, the Voting Section became heavily embroiled in
this controversy, because it was perceived to have embarked on an
aggressive policy of “maximization” in the preclearance process. In an
article published in 1992, Days expressed his view that “the 1982
amendments . . . incorporat[ed] . . . the new Section 2 standards into the
section 5 preclearance process” and that the DOJ “has taken the position
352
that such an incorporation was mandated by Congress.” Citing an
objection letter issued in 1991 by President Bush’s Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, John Dunne, Days observed that:
Under the department’s approach, of course, the retrogression
standard of Beer no longer poses an obstacle to full evaluation of
proposed changes. The question instead becomes whether the changes
provide minority voters with the greatest feasible access to the political

347. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. This provision is also referred to as the “Dole proviso.”
348. Boyd & Markman, supra note 346, at 1339, 1389–94.
349. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 104–10; see also David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting, and
Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts 74–75 (1999).
350. Grant Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1589,
1609–10 (2004). Models by political economists show there were no such “perverse” effects. See, e.g.,
Keisuke Nakao, Racial Redistricting for Minority Representation, 23 Econ. & Pol. 132 (2006). The
debate continues. Canon is correct in suggesting that “[i]n any event it seems clear that white
incumbents have not been as harmed as Democratic partisans feared, nor as much as Republican
partisans hoped.” Canon, supra note 349, at 74.
351. See authorities cited supra note 170; see also Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness:
The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr, in Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and
Congressional Redistricting 6, 26 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
352. Days, supra note 184, at 57.
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process in light of the “totality of the circumstances.” This issue will
353
have to be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court.

Conservatives charged that civil rights groups captured the CRD, and
that when John Dunne took office in 1990, the CRD adopted a much
more aggressive and rigid strategy of requiring jurisdictions to draw as
354
many majority-minority districts as possible. In 1991, Dunne objected
to Mississippi’s state house and senate plans and to five of the first six
355
state legislative maps in Texas. The rulings engendered intense interest.
Voting rights advocates hailed Dunne’s more aggressive policy,
proclaiming that it addressed “the central question in redistricting:
356
maximization.” An article in the Congressional Quarterly concluded
that the objections meant that covered jurisdictions now would be
357
required to draw as many majority-minority districts as possible. John
Dunne himself acknowledged that he might have “wandered into
358
maximization.”
359
The Supreme Court intervened in Shaw v. Reno and Miller v.
360
Johnson, strongly rebuking the DOJ for having gone too far in pushing
majority-minority districts. In Shaw, white voters challenged two
majority-minority congressional districts that North Carolina had drawn
as part of their redistricting plan after the 1990 Census gave the state an
361
additional congressional seat. The first plan that North Carolina had
submitted for preclearance contained only one majority black district out
362
of twelve total districts statewide. Blacks constituted 20% of the
363
population in the state. The DOJ objected to the plan on the grounds
that it diluted the minority vote, claiming that the North Carolina
General Assembly could have created a second majority-minority district
364
but failed to do so for “pretextual reasons.” In 1991, the legislature
then enacted a new plan with two majority-black districts, and the DOJ
365
precleared the plan. White voters challenged the plan, claiming that it
was as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the
366
Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor

353. Id.
354. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 97.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Beth Donovan, Nation Watches as Texas Struggles to Create Minority Districts, 49 Cong. Q.
Wkly. Rep. 2293, 2293–95 (Aug. 17, 1991).
358. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 144.
359. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
360. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
361. 509 U.S. at 633–34.
362. Id. at 634–35.
363. Id. at 633.
364. Id. at 635.
365. Id. at 635–36.
366. Id. at 633–34.
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found the shape of the district “so bizarre on its face” and such a
departure from traditional districting criteria (geographic compactness,
contiguousness, conformity to geographic boundaries or political
subdivisions) that it seemed “unexplainable on grounds other than
367
According to Justice O’Connor, the plan thus bore “an
race.”
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid” that reinforced
368
“impermissible racial stereotypes.” White voters had thus stated “an
analytically distinct claim” under the Equal Protection Clause that gave
them standing to sue on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally
classified based on race.
In Miller v. Johnson, Georgia redrew its congressional redistricting
369
plan in response to a DOJ objection under section 5. Ruling on a
constitutional challenge to the new plan, the Supreme Court held that
the DOJ had inappropriately interposed objections to maximize the
370
number of majority-minority districts. In doing so, the DOJ had
371
exceeded its authority under the statute. “Instead of grounding its
objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose,” the Court found
that “it would appear the [department] was driven by its policy of
maximizing majority-black districts,” thereby expanding its Section 5
authority “beyond what Congress intended” and the Court previously
372
upheld. The Court charged the DOJ with forcing states to “engage in
373
presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting.” Congressional
districts were “presumptively unconstitutional” if race was the
“predominant factor” in their creation. And a jurisdiction’s interest in
complying with section 5, the Court held, did not constitute a compelling
374
justification for this type of government action.
Arguably, then, the DOJ intruded significantly on covered
jurisdictions during the early 1990s with regard to the preclearance of
districting plans—if, that is, one grants the conservative interpretation of
these events. Can this be reconciled with the argument presented here,
that preclearance is consistent with localism and functioned, for the most
part, as a flexible monitoring/learning regime?
Much ink has been spilled on the question of whether the DOJ
exceeded its authority in the early 1990s. CRD career staff has
persistently denied that a maximization policy was ever followed, but

367. Id. at 644 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
368. Id. at 647.
369. 515 U.S. 900, 907 (1995).
370. See generally Cunningham, supra note 167.
371. Posner, supra note 168, at 80.
372. 515 U.S. at 924–25.
373. Id. at 927.
374. Id. at 926–27.
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have maintained that, after Beer, the Voting Section relied on
discriminatory intent as articulated in Village of Arlington Heights v.
375
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. and Wilkes County v. United
376
377
States in analyzing districting cases. Critics countered that the Voting
Section considered failure to maximize majority-minority districts
378
But this is a
evidence of discriminatory purpose per se.
misunderstanding of the Arlington Heights standard. Under Arlington
Heights, so long as other legitimate reasons for note drawing a majorityminority district were not deemed pretextual, the Attorney General
379
would not object to vote changes. Career staff, serving both Republican
and Democratic administrations, claim that they did not change the
380
standard or significantly alter preclearance procedures in the 1990s.
They also reject the charge of a politicization of preclearance during
381
the Bush I and Clinton years. The “bottom up” review process of
section 5 preclearance, according to staff, has been a “key institutional
382
bulwark in the DOJ against political decision-making.” Only after the
staff of the Voting Section has decided to recommend an objection
unanimously does the decision go up to the politically appointed
383
Assistant Attorney General. Decisions to preclear are forwarded to the
Assistant Attorney General for decision only “where the change is of
great significance (such as a statewide districting) or otherwise
384
particularly controversial.” Historically, the Attorney General has
never interposed an objection to a preclearance plan when the Voting
385
Section unanimously recommended it. Even if the DOJ became more
aggressive in pushing for majority-minority districts, by far the most
important factor in the creation of majority-minority districts was
litigation.

375. 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
376. 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–78 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1976).
377. See Posner, supra note 168, at 80; McCrary et al., supra note 168, at 284–86.
378. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 148.
379. See Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, at 8 (testimony of Mark A. Posner, Professor, Am.
Univ.) (“[A] five-Justice majority of the Court averred that the Department was using the purpose test
as a cover for implementing a near-unconstitutional policy of maximization. . . . Since purposeful
discrimination is the core conduct prohibited by the 15th [A]mendment, this statement seems
explainable only if the five Justices were referring to the false purpose test they believe the Justice
Department was enforcing. It is my conclusion, however, that the Justice Department, in fact, did not
apply the section 5 purpose test in an unlawful or inappropriate manner.”).
380. See, e.g., id. app. at 113, 125–26 (prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.) (providing an
empirical study of the grounds on which the DOJ interposed objections during this period); see also
Posner, supra note 168, at 80, 100.
381. See generally Posner, supra note 168.
382. Posner, supra note 257, at 13
383. Id. at 9.
384. Id.
385. Id.
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In addition, the Shaw line of cases placed significant limits on the
ability of the DOJ to require covered jurisdictions to draw additional
majority-minority districts. Critics of the Court were appalled by the
creation of a new cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment that
threw the “relatively orderly process of elaborating and refining the host
386
of questions raised by Congress . . . to an abrupt end.” Shaw and its
progeny threatened to undermine gains in black representation by
casting the creation of majority-minority districts into doubt. Even as
Justice O’Connor provided additional guidance to “[s]tates and lower
Courts . . . toil[ing] with the twin demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment [i.e. Shaw challenges] and the VRA,” in Bush v. Vera, the
Court never clarified what it meant by an impermissible “predominant
387
racial motive” in the creation of majority-minority districts. Clearly any
remedial effort would, in one sense, be driven by a racial motive,
whereas in another sense, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent in
Abrams v. Johnson, “racial motives . . . never explain a predominant
388
portion of a district’s entire boundary . . . .”
By 1993–1994, at any rate, the Supreme Court had started to put the
brakes on any DOJ attempts to push a maximization agenda via
preclearance. If, indeed, the preclearance process had become too
intrusive, inflexible, and commandeering in the redistricting context,
Shaw and its progeny insisted on a more passive approach by the DOJ by
undercutting objections to redistricting plans based on discriminatory
389
purpose. Grofman and Brunell have insisted that “in comparing the
1990s round and the 2000 round of redistricting, we believe it hard for
anyone to dispute that, in 2000, DOJ was exercising much greater caution
in deciding on which district merited an objection under section 5 than in
390
the 1990s . . . .” That the Supreme Court would play a role in defining
the limits of preclearance was, of course, contemplated by the statutory
scheme, even if one believes that the choice to do so in the case of North
Carolina’s redistricting plan in Shaw on Fourteenth Amendment grounds
was ill considered.

386. Canon, supra note 349, at 77.
387. 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
388. 521 U.S. 74, 116 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
389. Objections based on retrogression constituted 83%, 66%, 40%, and 98% of all objections
interposed during 1965–1979, the 1980s, the 1990s, and during 2000–2005, respectively. See Posner,
supra note 160, at 108 tbl.2. Thus, while the Attorney General interposed an increasing percentage of
total objections based on discriminatory purpose during the 1980s and the early 1990s, that trend was
abruptly curtailed by 2000. See id. Moreover, the total number of submissions by the Attorney General
dropped significantly, beginning in 1996. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel Charles, The Politics
of Preclearance, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 512, 519–21 (2007).
390. Bernard Grofman & Thomas Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The
Complex Interaction Between Law and Politics, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act, supra note
81, at 311, 326.
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Other observers, however, have interpreted the Shaw line of cases
as relatively tentative. Professor Sunstein has written:
[F]ollowing Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s cautious lead, the heart of
the current Court avoids clear rules and final resolutions. It allows
room for Congress’s and the states’ continued democratic deliberation,
and to accommodate new judgments about facts and values. It is a
court that leaves fundamental issues undecided . . . .
....
. . . [T]he court has avoided simple rules in its series of cases involving
bizarrely shaped voting districts redrawn to produce a different racial
makeup; it has insisted instead that constitutional challenges would
have to be decided on the basis of the details . . . .
....
. . . [The decisions are] ambivalent or catalytic rather than final or
decisive. If these points are right, O’Connor’s distinctive concurring
opinions represent not a failure of judicial nerve, but a healthy
reminder that judges are mere participants in America’s process of
391
democratic deliberation . . . .

In other words, the maximization controversy related primarily to
redistricting. But redistricting constituted only a small percentage of all
submissions. From 1982 to 2004, only 2.4% of changes involved
392
redistrictings (8622 of about 320,000 changes). Redistrictings drew
393
proportionately 16.4% of all objections. But the DOJ interposed many
more objections to other types of changes, such as annexations and
394
boundary changes (45%), and changes to methods of election (24.4%).
These three types of changes comprised an overwhelming 85.8% of all
objections interposed. Precinct, polling places, and absentee ballot
changes made up only 3.7% of all objections, despite accounting for the
395
highest percentage of submitted changes, at 43.7%. Objections to
redistrictings declined significantly during the period from 1995 to 2004,
from 318 between 1982 and 2004 to 46 between 1995 and 2004: 87.4%
396
objections to redistrictings were lodged before 1995.
5.

The Nonretrogression Standard During the Post-Shaw Period

In its post-Shaw jurisprudence, the Supreme Court interpreted
Beer’s nonretrogression standard ever more narrowly in other areas as
well, cabining DOJ discretion, reducing its authority to interpose

391. Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again, the High Court Takes Only Small Steps,
Wash. Post, July 6, 1997, at C1.
392. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 34 tbl.6.
393. Id. at 36 & fig.4.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 35 & tbl.5. But redistrictings declined less than other types of changes and, during the
period between 1995 and 2004, constituted the greatest absolute number of objections. Id.
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objections, and limiting its ability to communicate with local
397
jurisdictions. In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish I),
the Court elaborated its view that the retrogression standard did not
authorize the Attorney General to interpose an objection on the grounds
398
that a voting change violates the Constitution or section 2 of the VRA.
In Bossier Parish II, the Court went even further in advancing the
somewhat bizarre judgment that even discriminatory intent could not
justify an objection to a vote change by the DOJ; only a strangely
399
metaphysical “retrogressive intent” would justify a DOJ objection. The
Court fixated on the “federalism costs” of preclearance, as it increasingly
400
limited its reach. Katz has argued that these decisions reflected the
401
Supreme Court majority’s view that the DOJ was overreaching. In
several decisions, the lower courts had specifically criticized the
administration of section 5 review, condemning the DOJ’s practice of
informal negotiations and exchanges between the Voting Section staff
and covered jurisdictions, as well as the close relationship between the
402
staff and civil rights groups who were active in enforcing the VRA. The
district court in Miller had vehemently criticized the “close cooperation”
between the DOJ and the ACLU, calling the frequent communication
403
between the two “disturbing” and “an embarrassment.”
This cramped interpretation of retrogression misinterpreted the
compromise struck in the 1970s and 1980s to accept gradual, incremental
change. After Beer, the DOJ could still rely on discriminatory purpose to
push for incremental change. Now the DOJ was barred from urging any
amelioration on covered jurisdictions, limiting it entirely to preventing
“backsliding.” Discriminatory purpose could also no longer serve as a
404
basis for objections as it had in the past. The Supreme Court thereby
undercut the dialogic strategy that characterized the administrative

397. Posner, supra note 168, at 94–95.
398. 520 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1997). This invalidated the DOJ’s regulation that specified that a “clear”
results violation should trigger an objection. “A ‘results violation’ refers to a voting plan or proposal
intentionally drawn to minimize minority voting strength[], and which has a discriminatory result in
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 21
n.85.
399. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 337–41 (2000).
400. Posner, supra note 168, at 80.
401. See generally Katz, supra note 78.
402. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 167, at 54.
403. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1362, 1368 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
404. As Posner told Congress,
[T]he section 5 purpose test now only applies if, per chance, a jurisdiction were to intend to
cause a retrogression in minorities’ electoral opportunity, but somehow messes up and
adopts a change that, in fact, is not retrogressive. This is highly unlikely to occur, and in fact,
in the nearly 5 years since Bossier Parish was decided, the Justice Department has reviewed
approximately 76,000 voting changes and no such incompetent retrogressor has appeared.
Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, at 20 (testimony of Mark A. Posner, Professor, Am. Univ.).
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preclearance process—an ironic outcome, given the Court’s criticism of
what it perceived as the DOJ’s unilateral maximization policy. Against
the background of the Supreme Court’s increasing limitation on both the
DOJ’s authority and the reach of the retrogression standard, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft was viewed as one
405
further step in the “retrogression of retrogression.”
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court addressed the flexibility of the
406
preclearance standard and reaffirmed the importance of local voice. On
both counts the Court arguably solved a problem that did not exist. The
case likely arose in the first place because of the straightjacket that the
Court had imposed on the Voting Section. When the parties arrived in
court, the first question that one of the panel judges asked was why they
had not been able to work something out, given the small differences in
407
their positions. The answer was that the Court’s severe condemnation
of DOJ pressure on covered jurisdictions made it very difficult for the
408
DOJ to carry on such conversations.
Ashcroft involved Georgia’s post-2000 legislative redistricting
409
plan. The plan was the result of a partisan gerrymander by white and
410
black Democratic legislators. In an effort to hold onto the statehouse in
the face of an inevitable Republican trend, Georgia’s legislative
redistricting committee proposed a plan that unpacked existing black
majority-minority districts in order to redistribute black (read
411
Democratic) voters to democratic candidates in adjacent districts. The
redistricting plan shaved existing majority-minority districts precariously
thin, reducing by five the number of districts with a black voting age
population in excess of 60%, and added only one majority-minority
412
district of more than 50% black voting age population (“BVAP”).
Because of low levels of registration and turnout in African-American
communities, and high levels of racially-polarized voting, a BVAP over
60% or 65% had frequently been necessary to afford blacks the ability to
413
elect candidates of their choice in Georgia state legislative districts.
Nonetheless, the plan was approved near unanimously by the black

405. Karlan, supra note 3.
406. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
407. Telephone Interview with David Becker, Project Dir., Election Initiatives for the Pew Ctr. on
the States (Dec. 5, 2009).
408. Id.
409. Specifically, Ashcroft involved Georgia’s senate plan, which was also at issue in Miller.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 466–69.
410. Id. at 469 (“The goal of the Democratic leadership—black and white—was to maintain the
number of majority-minority districts and also increase the number of Democratic Senate seats.”); see
also Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1716.
411. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1716.
412. Id.
413. Id.
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414

legislative delegation. Robert Brown, who chaired the subcommittee
415
that had drawn up the senate plan, was also African-American. Brown
testified at trial in support of the plan, as did other leading African416
American legislators.
The DOJ precleared the statehouse plan, but objected that the
reductions in black voting age populations in Senate Districts 2 (from
60.58 % to 50.31%), 12 (from 55.43% to 50.66%), and 15 (from 62.45%
to 50.80%) threatened the ability of minority voters to reelect black
417
incumbents. At trial, the DOJ relied on expert testimony that the
percentages were not sufficient for black voters to elect candidates of
418
their choice, given the levels of racial bloc voting. The district court
419
sided with the DOJ and refused to preclear the plan.
In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court
adopted the dissenting district court judge’s view that “would have given
‘greater credence to the political expertise and motivation of Georgia’s
420
African-American political leaders’” than to the DOJ experts. The
Court cited testimony by Georgia’s black legislative leaders and
Congressman John Lewis that emphasized the importance of unpacking
black majority-minority districts to extend the influence of the black
vote, and, most importantly, to preserve the Democratic majority in the
statehouse, which guaranteed valuable committee chairmanships and
421
leadership positions to blacks. Specifically,
Congressman Lewis testified that “giving real power to black voters
comes from the kind of redistricting efforts the State of Georgia has
made,” and that the Senate plan “will give real meaning to voting for
African Americans” because “you have a greater chance of putting in
422
office people that are going to be responsive.”

According to the Court, the new plan was not retrogressive. It preserved
black legislative leadership positions. It promoted coalition-building
across racial lines by lowering BVAP. And it created additional so-called
“influence districts” in which minorities could play a substantial, if not
423
decisive role, in electing a candidate for office.
Even as the Court questioned the DOJ’s application of the old
preclearance standard to the facts of the case, it redefined the
nonretrogression standard in the vote-dilution context. Whereas

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 1716–17.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 40, 42 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
See id. at 42, 89.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472–73.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475 (quoting Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 487–88.
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previously the retrogression inquiry had focused on a minority’s
“ability . . . to elect candidates of [their] choice,” the Court now
emphasized a much broader metric: “the extent of the minority group’s
424
opportunity to participate in the political process.” The Court rejected
any “single statistic,” and called for a “totality of circumstances”
assessment that included the creation of minority “influence districts”
425
Justice
and legislative leadership positions as relevant factors.
O’Connor wrote for the majority:
[A]ny assessment of the retrogression of a minority group’s effective
exercise of the electoral franchise depends on an examination of all the
relevant circumstances, such as the ability of minority voters to elect
their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group’s
opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of
creating a nonretrogressive plan. . . .
In assessing the totality of the circumstances, a court should not
focus solely on the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a
candidate of its choice. While this factor is an important one in the § 5
retrogression inquiry, it cannot be dispositive or exclusive. . . .

....
In addition to the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a
candidate of its choice, the other highly relevant factor in a
retrogression inquiry is the extent to which a new plan changes the
minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process.
“[T]he power to influence the political process is not limited to winning
elections.”
Thus, a court must examine whether a new plan adds or subtracts
“influence districts”—where minority voters may not be able to elect a
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in
426
the electoral process.

The Ashcroft decision was highly controversial. The decision clearly
reaffirmed the case-by-case assessment and flexibility of the preclearance
standard. It also explicitly deferred to local knowledge over expert
analysis. Commentators concerned about competitive elections, and
increasingly skeptical about the continued need for guaranteed safe seats
for black legislators in the South, welcomed the Court’s abandonment of
what they saw as the “relatively mechanical assessment of voting
practices” under section 5 that had turned the assessment of black
427
electoral opportunity into “little more than . . . sixth-grade arithmetic.”
Ashcroft supporters suggested that the pre-Ashcroft standard was a rigid
428
understanding of the VRA that completely inverted the Act’s policies.

424. Id. at 482.
425. Id. at 480–81.
426. Id. at 479–80, 482 (citations omitted) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 99 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
427. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1713.
428. The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
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On the other hand, voting rights advocates feared that Ashcroft
spelled the end of descriptive representation, which had been the
429
baseline for gains in black representation. They also questioned the
Ashcroft Court’s assessment of the pre-Ashcroft standard. David Becker,
a DOJ attorney who litigated Ashcroft, contends that “the pre-Ashcroft
standard, as first established in Beer, was not nearly as rigid, mechanical
430
or simple as some would suggest.” Becker and others pointed out that
the DOJ had always applied an “intensely local appraisal” akin to the
one that evolved under section 2’s prohibition against vote dilution; that
Gingles had never “streamlined” the standard to the extent that it
eliminated the multifactor analysis altogether; and that the DOJ’s own
431
guidelines made this explicit. As Meghann Donahue points out,
“Contrary to the common perception that section 5 enforcement under
Beer was merely a matter of looking at the number of majority-minority
districts in the proposed plan compared with the benchmark,
examination of the Department’s past enforcement practices reveals a
432
rich history of localized and nuanced review.” At any rate, Professor

Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (testimony of Richard H. Pildes).
429. Karlan, supra note 3, at 30–31.
430. David J. Becker, Saving Section 5: Reflections on Georgia v. Ashcroft, and Its Impact on the
Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, supra note
4, at 223, 226 (“In reality, neither the courts nor the DOJ have relied upon the simplistic, mechanistic
approach that some perceive. While remaining true to Beer’s requirement that there can be no
retrogression in minority voters’ effective exercise of the franchise, as defined by their ability to elect
candidates of their choice, the DOJ and the lower court in Ashcroft (as well as courts in other cases)
reviewed massive amounts of evidence, including: expert testimony regarding voting patterns, racially
polarized voting, and whether certain candidates (regardless of race) were the preferred candidates of
minority voters; the demographic makeup of districts and the plans as a whole, the success of minoritypreferred candidates in past elections; the approval or disapproval of minority legislators (as
evidenced by not only their votes, but also their public statements expressed in the legislature and
otherwise); and the expressed opinions of minority leader, candidates, and voters regarding the
plans.”).
431. Karlan, supra note 3, at 30–31; see also generally Becker, supra note 430.
432. Meghann E. Donahue, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated”: Administering
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1651, 1672 (2004).
Donahue further notes,
Analysis of the section 5 administrative review process confirms that the regulations’ call
to evaluate myriad “complex” facts actually is heeded by Voting Section reviewers.
Although some commentators have recognized the Department’s increasingly functional
approach to submissions since the Supreme Court’s sharp rebuke of DOJ practices in the
1990s, studies of section 5 submissions from the 1980s reveal that jurisdiction-specific review
has been a mainstay of the DOJ’s section 5 enforcement far longer. For example, the studies
disclosed situations in which the same changes in different locations received disparate
treatment by the Voting Section. In Midland, Texas, the Attorney General precleared the
institution of a majority vote requirement and numbered posts for independent school
district elections because of an absence of racially polarized voting within the jurisdiction,
but the Department objected to precisely the same change in Comal, Texas. The
Department approved an open primary system in Louisiana while objecting to the adoption
of such a system in Mississippi due to different election patterns in the two states.
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Bernard Grofman noted that especially after 2000, the DOJ proceeded
with a “greater caution and functional approach” that “does not seem to
have been much noticed by legal commentators,” but was “all-pervasive”
433
and “apparent.” Each “district was evaluated in an intensely local and
fact-specific appraisal (regarding) whether or not there appeared to be a
substantively significant change in the likelihood that [the district] would
434
elect minority candidates of choice.”
Even as they expressed their concern about the increased burden
that the new standard imposed, those with greater familiarity of the
administration of preclearance conceded that the new standard could be
435
navigated. The Ashcroft opinion could indeed be read narrowly as
reaffirming the VRA’s institutional evolution as a regime that would
leave electoral design in the hands of local constituencies where possible,
promote incremental improvement, afford covered jurisdictions
flexibility to experiment, promote participation and negotiated
compromise between local minorities and the white majority, and credit
local knowledge—even as the opinion carves out a narrow exception to
the pre-Ashcroft retrogression standard. On this reading, the Ashcroft
retrogression standard has “a presumptive protection for ability-to-elect
districts, with the qualification that reducing the number of ability-toelect districts in an effort to protect legislative leadership positions for
minority legislators would not be retrogressive if that effort is supported
436
by the relevant minority state legislators.” In other words, there could
be situations in which the loss of majority-minority districts still accrued
to the overall advantage of minorities, precisely in the kind of situation
with which Ashcroft dealt. Professor David Canon, for example, argued,
One virtue of Ashcroft was that it allowed that flexibility in the totality
of circumstances test for retrogression. There is no doubt that the
representation of racial interests is much stronger in legislatures that
are controlled by the Democratic party. Trading a few ability-to-elect
districts for influence districts to maintain majority control would be
437
worth it—if the trade could be made with some certainty.

Ultimately, Ashcroft’s critics prevailed, and the “ability to elect”
standard was written into section 5 in the VRARA, thereby prohibiting

Id. at 1473 (footnotes omitted); see also Karlan, supra note 3, at 30–31.
433. Grofman & Brunell, supra note 390, at 326.
434. Id. at 15.
435. Telephone Interview with David Becker, supra note 407. See generally Bernard Grofman,
Operationalizing the Section 5 Retrogression Standard of the Voting Rights Act in the Light of Georgia
v. Ashcroft: Social Science Perspectives on Minority Influence, Opportunity and Control, 5 Election
L.J. 250 (2006).
436. David T. Canon, Renewing the Voting Rights Act: Retrogression, Influence, and the “Georgia
v. Ashcroft Fix”, 7 Election L.J. 3, 24 (2008).
437. Id. But see Karlan, supra note 3, at 32–33 (arguing that the possibility of successfully balancing
such trade-offs was purely theoretical, given all the other political variables).
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tradeoffs between majority-minority districts (or rather ability-to-elect
438
districts) and mere influence districts.

IV. The False Promise of Centralization, Standardization, and
Bright-Line Rules
The preceding analysis of section 5 preclearance is brought into
better relief by contrasting the VRA’s preclearance regime with other
voting rights laws that have relied on one-size-fits-all, bright-line rules
with a straightforward mathematical application. This Part briefly
compares the Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote rulings, with its
439
more recent decision in Bartlett v. Strickland. In both instances, the
Court insisted on imposing “mathematically administrable” bright-line
rules justified by reference to purportedly self-evident, geometrical
principles of democracy.
A. One-Person/One-Vote
It has frequently been said that bright-line rules are “a key virtue in
the context of voting rights cases, a context that ‘cries out for any legal
440
oversight to take the form of clear, readily-followable rules.’” The oneperson/one-vote rule is the classic case in point. Professor Samuel
Issacharoff has called it “the single most successful remedial effort by the
441
Supreme Court in our history.” It is widely viewed as a fundamental
principle of democratic institutions, the Supreme Court’s application of
442
which has “solved the problem of grossly malapportioned districts.”
Professor Richard Hasen identifies it as the exemplar of a
“professionalized, centralized, and nonpartisan election administration”
443
that is the “hallmark[] of a mature democracy.”

438. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).
439. 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
440. Luke McLaughlin, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional Districts, Party Primaries and Manageable
Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 312, 316–17 (2005) (quoting Richard H. Plides, Is Voting
Rights Law Now at War with Itself?: Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. Rev.
1517, 1556 (2002)).
441. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 688
(2006) (testimony of Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law). Issacharoff has noted
that the principle of one-person/one-vote is regarded by many as “so deeply embedded in our culture
as to seemingly defy any controversy.” Id. It is generally deemed to be “so in keeping with the most
rudimentary sense of democracy and legitimacy” that any student of the apportionment cases could
not “fathom that a . . . democratic society could be organized on any other basis.” Id.
442. Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration and the New Institutionalism, 98 Calif. L. Rev.
1075, 1075 (2010) (reviewing Gerken, supra note 28).
443. Id.
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This view, however, is not universally shared among election law
experts. Even as it promised fair representation and majority rule in the
face of egregious vote dilution across the country, the rule was highly
444
contested and has generated significant controversy. Although the oneperson/one-vote rule may well represent the most extraordinary exertion
445
of power on the part of the Court, its success has been mixed at best.
In Colegrove v. Green, the Supreme Court refused to wade “into the
political thicket” to reform state legislative districting, calling the issue a
446
nonjusticiable political question. In Baker v. Carr, the Court reopened
the issue, suggesting that the “crazy quilt” of legislative districts in
447
Tennessee was unconstitutional, because it lacked any justification.
When Baker came down several states started reforming their legislative
448
redistricting schemes on their own. But the Supreme Court was not
satisfied to prod states into reforming their own systems. Instead it
449
announced the equipopulation rule in Gray v. Sanders, Reynolds v.
450
451
Sims, and Wesberry v. Sanders. Reynolds read the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring “equal
representation” of individuals and imposed the one-person/one-vote rule
on state apportionment for its legislature. It interpreted that rule—more
aptly referred to as a principle—as the equipopulation rule: “[A]s a
federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis,” meaning that “the Equal Protection
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
452
population as is practicable.” In Wesberry, the Court applied this
453
principle to congressional districts. In subsequent cases, the Supreme

444. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
213, 214 (2003); see also Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 31 (articulating principles of section 2
of the VRA that the Congress subsequently adopted in its 1982 amendments of the VRA); Michael W.
McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 103, 103 (2000). But see Laughlin McDonald, A Voting Rights Odyssey: Black
Enfranchisement in Georgia 80 (2003) (“Baker v. Carr was not a racial discrimination case, but its
concept that voting districts must be composed of substantially equal populations was to prove one of
the keys that opened the door to minority officeholding in Georgia.”).
445. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 301, at 1707, 1740; Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated
Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1299,
1351 (2002); see also Hayden, supra note 444.
446. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
447. 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962).
448. Persily et al., supra note 445, at 1336.
449. 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
450. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
451. 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964).
452. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
453. Note that the one-person/one-vote rule is just as likely to be interpreted as requiring
legislative districts with equal numbers of voting age population, the measure the Supreme Court
adopted for limits on actionable vote dilution under section 2 in Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231,
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Court adopted a zero deviation standard for congressional districts, and a
454
10% deviation tolerance for state and local electoral districts.
The rule unhinged longstanding state and local practices, replacing
them with a formula that appeared to be a neutral deduction from
democratic principles by an almost geometric logic. Rather than devise a
remedy against state and local lock-ups of the political process that could
be tailored to particular circumstances, the Court legislated a one-sizefits-all solution. And the subsequent extensions of the rule interpreted
455
that solution ever more rigidly and ideologically.
The Court’s action seemed intent on rendering the “crazy quilt” of
congressional, state, and local districts measurable and transparent along
456
a dimension that was administrable with “mathematical precision.”
Administrability by the federal judiciary was a key reason the Court
457
chose the equipopulation rule. The rule would trump all other
districting considerations. Traditional districting criteria, such as
conforming district lines to the boundaries of political subdivisions,
maintaining communities of interest, and incorporating considerations of
458
natural geography, were subordinated. According to Justice Stevens’s
critical assessment in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of
Colorado, the one-person/one-vote rulings
convert[ed] a particular political philosophy into a constitutional rule,
binding upon each of the 50 States, from Maine to Hawaii, from
Alaska to Texas, without regard and without respect for the many
individualized and differentiated characteristics of each State,
characteristics stemming from each State’s distinct history, distinct
geography, distinct distribution of population, and distinct political
459
heritage.

It is instructive to see the Court’s approach in the one-person/onevote cases as a high-water mark of a faith in the centralization of
460
authority in the federal government. The moral authority of the
Supreme Court and the national government during this period was

1249 (2009).
454. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 742 (1983); Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65, 70 (N.D.
Ga. 1965) (holding “that a variance of more than 15 percent” for Georgia state legislative districts
“would be difficult, if not impossible, to justify”).
455. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692–93 (1989) (abolishing New York City’s Board of
Estimate on one-person/one vote grounds).
456. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
457. John Hart Ely famously quipped about the rigid demands of one-person/one-vote that
“administrability is [the doctrine’s] long suit, and the more troublesome question is what else it has to
recommend it.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 121 (1980).
458. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Richard L Engstrom, The
Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and
Effective Representation, 1976 Ariz. St. L.J. 277, 278–79.
459. Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
460. See Patterson, supra note 35, at 214; see also Graham, supra note 34, at 179.
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unquestioned. The faith in the Warren Court’s civil rights jurisprudence
by liberals was matched, at the time, perhaps only by their faith in
461
modern science to address social ills. The mathematically precise
equipopulation rule answered an ideal of surveillability from the
462
center. In subjecting the states and localities to an equipopulation rule,
standardization did not merely effect substantial changes, but it did so in
a manner that made an otherwise unsurveillable thicket of local political
divisions and distributions of power legible to a centralized federal
463
authority. The rule reshaped political geography to promote mechanical
464
administrability from Washington.
Notwithstanding its failure to specify a precise remedy for vote
dilution, Baker resulted in a nationwide reassessment of state districting
schemes because it exposed state districting plans to likely constitutional
challenge. Charles Rhyne, the counsel for appellants in Baker, summed
up the promise of Baker as follows:
[I]t is certain that archaic state legislative machinery will now be
modernized.
Genuine state constitutional reform is now possible.
The extensive nation-wide dialogue on the fundamentals of our
system of government provides an opportunity to restudy and
reallocate public powers and functions to those levels of government
465
best able to perform them under twentieth-century conditions.

This dialogue about fundamentals, however, was cut short by the
direction that the Court would take. The Court’s decisions in Sanders,
Reynolds, and the other one-person/one-vote cases bypassed existing
state and local political arrangements to directly require every
jurisdiction throughout the country to reshape its political geography by
adopting a measure of vote dilution that would rigidly standardize
466
districts. The Court’s ruling applied nationwide, regardless of whether
461. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism &
the Problem of Value 11–12 (1973).
462. See Scott, supra note 133, at 4 (“[H]igh-modernist ideology. . . . is best conceived as
a . . . muscle-bound [] version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the
expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including
human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific
understanding of natural laws.”).
463. See James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community,
80 N.C. L. Rev. 1237, 1238–41 (2002) (arguing that the “liberal and nationalizing,” “top-to-bottom
regime of one person, one vote” served to “flatten and homogenize local identity” by replacing a
“thicker conception of democracy in which citizens are firmly situated” in a local political community
with a “thin variety” of democratic politics).
464. See id. at 1251.
465. Gordon E. Baker, Whatever Happened to the Reapportionment Revolution in the United
States?, in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences 257, 261 (Bernard Grofman &
Arend Lijphart eds., 2003) (quoting Charles Rhyne).
466. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (striking down a congressional redistricting plan
despite a less than one percent population deviation between the largest and smallest districts);
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it was “congruent and proportional” to an ongoing constitutional
467
violation.
A perceived virtue of the equipopulation rule was that it could
apparently be justified on nonpartisan, politically neutral, normative
grounds. Treating vote dilution as a violation of an individual’s
fundamental right to equal protection under state and local laws
translated directly into a geometric principle that could be applied like a
grid to the electoral map without mediation by a potentially partisan
process. The equipopulation rule thus promised to render an
unsurveillable state and local “political thicket” legible and subservient
to formal, nonpartisan national purposes by eliminating the ability of
entrenched and partisan local elites to take cover behind confusing local
institutions and practices. The hope was that political elites would be
468
exposed to, and chastened by, the electorate. Moreover, the imposition
of a grid permitted federal courts to readily step in when needed by
establishing simple, precise, and mathematically demonstrable criteria
for the constitutional violation.
The Court had high hopes that its vote dilution standard would give
“each citizen . . . an equally effective voice in the election of members of
469
his state legislature.” In fact, the equipopulation principle could
guarantee no such thing. On its own, it would not necessarily improve the
rights of individuals to full and fair participation in the political process.
It would not necessarily eliminate “minority rule.” And it did not
470
necessarily improve the situation of racial minority voters in the South.
The limitations of the equipopulation rule have been the source of
much frustration both among scholars and on the bench. Reynolds’s
framing of vote dilution as an individual right under the Equal Protection
Clause has limited the possibilities of a more comprehensive institutional
471
response. Many, including the Supreme Court, have since been looking

Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in Election Cases Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1469, 1481 (2002) (“[T]he lion’s share of elections even on
the local level are conducted using the one-person, one-vote standard.”).
467. See generally Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25 (identifying the Supreme Court’s
incongruent treatments of malapportionment and racial vote dilution under the Equal Protection
Clause).
468. Persily, et al., supra note 445, at 1316.
469. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
470. While it increased the voting power of blacks in Atlanta until the legislature adopted new
rules (including a countywide run-off), it significantly diminished the voting power of blacks in the
Alabama “black belt” who were beginning to register and vote. McDonald, supra note 444, at 80–103
(describing the events in Georgia); Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 39 n.261 (noting that
Reynolds stripped Alabama’s rural, predominantly black counties of their legislative influence
virtually on the eve of the massive black enfranchisement brought about by the Voting Rights Act of
1965).
471. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 645
(2002) (“[T]he current doctrines of individual rights of access and protection against discrimination do
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for another silver bullet that would supplement the silver bullet that the
472
equipopulation rule had promised, but failed, to be. Such a response, as
473
experts increasingly agree, is exceedingly unlikely.
The problem with fixing vote dilution by treating the issue as a
violation of an individual right under the Equal Protection Clause, as has
been generally acknowledged to be the case in the literature, is that it
misunderstands that an individual’s vote is valuable only to the extent
that her vote is aggregated with the votes of other politically like-minded
individuals, and is therefore better understood as a right of association
474
with a group. Minorities in control of the districting process can, in
theory, crack, pack, and stack even majorities so as to defeat majority
475
rule, notwithstanding the equipopulation rule.
The Court mandated that redistricting take place every ten years
476
based on population changes reflected in the decennial census. Insofar
as districting is left in the hands of the state legislatures in the majority of
states, legislators are afforded significant opportunity for gerrymanders.
The equipopulation rule, as already stated, does not preclude linedrawing that protects incumbents, cracks, packs, and stacks unfriendly
constituencies, and otherwise distributes political capital according to the
whims of those who control the line-drawing process. It has been argued
that by supervening and acting as a constraint on other traditional
districting criteria—such as maintaining political subdivisions, following
natural geographical boundaries, and so forth—the equipopulation rule
477
facilitates self-interested line drawing. Today’s precise computerized
precinct-by-precinct, block-by-block mapping of political and racial
demographics, compiled in databases that can be manipulated with the
help of readily available but sophisticated districting software, makes it
increasingly likely that election outcomes are already decided before the
ink on the redistricting plan is dry. The equipopulation rule does little, if
anything, to curtail such gerrymanders and may, indeed, be partially
responsible for the ever-increasing number of uncompetitive
congressional districts resulting from bi-partisan gerrymanders.
not capture the potential risk to the competitive legitimacy of the political process.”).
472. See, e.g., Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–80 (2004).
473. Id. at 281 (“As the following discussion reveals, no judicially discernible and manageable
standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must
conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . .”). The one-person/one-vote rule
was directed at curbing political gerrymandering. A flexible standard, however, would have better
addressed the issue of political process failure. See Hasen, supra note 466, at 1489–98.
474. As Justice Kennedy has recently remarked in Veith, the First Amendment might have opened
up a more considered approach to the problem. Veith, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 Emory L.J. 869, 884 (1995).
475. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein et al., Election Law: Cases and Materials 103–05 (4th
ed. 2008).
476. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964).
477. Engstrom, supra note 458, at 278–79.
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The equipopulation rule, moreover, did little to improve minority
vote dilution, notwithstanding its association with other voting rights
reforms, such as the VRA. Many assume that reapportionment brought
benefits to black urban communities, because the legislatures became
more responsive to urban voters. But in Tennessee, as elsewhere in the
South, the beneficiaries were generally adversaries of black vote
478
equalization. Those who benefited directly from reapportionment were
479
not minorities, but urban and suburban whites. Whatever benefits
blacks achieved through the resulting increase in urban voting strength
were quickly wiped out in subsequent elections by instituting multi480
member districts.
As the Court had recognized in Colegrove v. Green, invalidating a
state’s districting scheme, and thus potentially moving to a statewide atlarge scheme, could damage minorities by submerging their vote into the
481
population at large. This was true for Southern urban blacks, who often
constituted a geographically discrete minority large enough to elect a
482
representative from a single-member geographical district. Southern
jurisdictions increasingly shifted to at-large election systems after the
483
imposition of the equipopulation rule. In at-large systems, of course,
the one-person/one-vote formula could get no purchase on vote dilution,
because there were no districts to equalize. Hence jurisdictions could
avoid the constitutional violation without giving up their ability to keep
blacks out altogether by districting alone, where, as throughout the South
484
(but also nationwide), racial bloc voting prevailed. The only way to
remedy such an evasion was to require electing representatives from

478. J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of
the Second Reconstruction 165–70 (1999); Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 18–19 (discussing
the Court’s failure to address racial vote dilution in Atlanta in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965),
and concluding that “[t]he Court failed . . . to engage in any thorough exploration of the implications
for racial minorities of the one-person, one-vote rule.”); Douglas Smith, Into the Political Thicket:
Reapportionment and the Rise of Suburban Power, in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism 263,
289 (Matthew D. Lassiter & Joseph Crespino eds., 2010).
479. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 2–4; see, e.g., Orville Vernon Burton et al., South
Carolina, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 190, 201; McCrary et al., supra note 303, at 38, 47;
McDonald et al., supra note 303, at 67, 73; Frank R. Parker et al., Mississippi, in Quiet Revolution,
supra note 4, at 136.
480. After Reynolds v. Sims forced the reapportionment of the Alabama statehouse, one black
representative, the first since reconstruction, was elected to the legislature. Blacksher & Menefee,
supra note 25, at 2–4. However, at the same time, the clout of the rural “black belt” was effectively
diminished. Id.
481. 328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946).
482. See generally Quiet Revolution, supra note 4 (providing statistics).
483. See authorities cited supra note 479.
484. See Grofman, supra note 435, at 280 (“[N]othing in the discussion in Epstein or O’Halloran
(or the sources to which they cite) is persuasive about their claim that racially polarized voting in the
South is now declining.”). See generally Katz et al., supra note 4 (showing that racial bloc voting
remains a significant problem).
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single-member districts. Recognizing the harm of vote dilution required
an altogether different analysis than the one provided by Reynolds.
There is a large literature on the vicissitudes of the equipopulation
rule that need not be rehearsed here. The point here is merely to contrast
the intrusiveness of the one-person/one-vote rule, the merits of which are
never raised as a constitutional matter, with the flexibility and local
sensitivity of the VRA’s preclearance regime, which is somehow held to
a much higher constitutional standard.
B. BARTLETT V. STRICKLAND: Defining Majority-Minority Districts
with Mathematical Precision
485

In its recent decision in Bartlett v. Strickland, the Supreme Court
appears to have looked for the same type of magic bullet that the oneperson/one-vote rule promised to provide. Questionably relying on an
abstract principle of majoritarianism (which most district-based elections
486
do not espouse), the Court defined “majority-minority” districts as
487
districts with a 50% or higher minority voting age population. The
superficially appealing rule of Strickland, however, threatens to
undermine coalition-building and the broader inquiry into minority
participation that the Ashcroft Court sought to encourage under section
5. Instead of encouraging incremental change, it threatens to lock
existing majority-minority districts in place.
In Strickland, the North Carolina legislature created an additional
minority opportunity district that crossed Pender County and Hannover
488
County lines in the southeast of the state. The legislature justified the
489
additional district as one mandated by section 2 of the VRA. The new
district was a coalition district with a total black population of 42.9%, a
BVAP of 39.4%, and a population in which 53.7% of registered
490
Democratic voters were black. Plaintiffs challenged the new district
based on a whole-county provision (“WCP”) in the North Carolina
Constitution, which provides that “no country shall be divided” in the
491
formation of state house and senate districts. In an earlier decision, the
North Carolina Supreme Court had held that “any new redistricting

485. 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
486. Most U.S. district-based elections are plurality vote, first-past-the-post systems in which the
winner is the one who gains the most votes, but not necessarily a majority of the votes cast. In the
United States, Congress and the President are elected this way. So are most state legislatures. See
Andrew Reynolds et al., Int’l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, Election System
Design: The New International Idea Handbook 31, 32 35, 132, 172 (reprt. 2008) (comparing the
U.S. system to other national systems).
487. 129 S. Ct. at 1244.
488. Id. at 1239.
489. Id. at 1247.
490. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689).
491. N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3).
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plan[] . . . shall depart from strict compliance with the legal requirements
set forth herein [including the WCP] only to the extent necessary to
492
comply with federal law.” The plaintiffs in Strickland claimed that
section 2 only mandated “majority-minority” districts, defined as districts
in excess of 50% minority voting age population, and that the new
493
district therefore could not be justified in the face of the WCP.
Construing the amended section 2 in Gingles, the U.S. Supreme
Court had identified three “necessary preconditions” for a claim that a
494
use of multimember districts constitutes actionable vote dilution.
Under Gingles, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the minority group “is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a de facto
majority in a single-member district,” (2) that the minority group is
“politically cohesive,” and (3) that “the white majority votes sufficiently
as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred
495
496
candidate. Only when a party has established these requirements
does a Court go on to analyze whether a section 2 violation has occurred
497
based on the totality of circumstances. Following precedent, the North
Carolina panel that heard the Strickland case explained that “the first
Gingles precondition ‘depends on the political realities extant in the
particular district in question, not just the raw numbers of black voters
498
present in the general population of the district.’” The critical question,
according to the panel, was whether minority voters form “a de facto
majority that can elect candidates of their choosing,” considering the
499
totality of circumstances and not “sheer numbers alone.” Citing
Ashcroft, the state panel
described the challenged District 18 as an “ability to elect” or
“coalition” district in which African-American voters “are able to form
coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no
need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect
500
candidates of their own choice.”

The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 2
claims require a threshold showing that the minority group “is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district”—a requirement that, as a matter of law, could

492. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 250–51 (N.C. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 397 (N.C. 2002)).
493. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 490, at 16–20.
494. It later held that those requirements applied equally to section 2 cases involving single
member districts. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993).
495. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
496. Id.
497. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994).
498. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 490, at 10 (quoting state court panel).
499. Id. (quoting state court panel) (internal quotation marks omitted).
500. Id. at 11 (quoting state court panel) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not be met by districts with a minority voting age population below
501
The North Carolina Supreme Court also held that the
50%.
appropriate measure of population was the “minority voting age
502
population.” Neither issue had been previously settled.
In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. Only minority opportunity districts
with a 50% or greater black voting age population are mandated by
503
section 2. Mandatory recognition of crossover claims, the Court
reasoned, would create serious tension with the third Gingles
requirement: To the extent that minorities could rely on white crossover
voting in the district, the majority was not voting as a bloc to defeat the
504
minority preferred candidate.
In oral argument, petitioners had urgently invoked Justice
O’Connor’s vision that “[t]he Voting Rights Act should be interpreted in
such a way as to encourage a transition to a society where race no longer
505
matters.” Coalition districts, they argued, were “crucial” in promoting
this goal:
Coalition districts bring races together by fostering political alliances
across racial lines. As a result they serve to diminish racial polarization
over time. Coalition districts help us in reaching the point where race
will no longer matter in drawing district lines. These districts bring us
one step closer to fulfilling our Nation’s moral and ethical obligation to
506
create an integrated society.

The majority, however, rejected this reasoning. The majority argued
that “[r]ecognizing a § 2 claim where minority voters cannot elect their
candidate of choice based on their own votes and without assistance from
others would grant special protection to their right to form political
507
coalitions that is not authorized by the section.” According to the
Court, the 50% rule drew a “clear line” that served the need for
508
“workable standards for sound judicial and legislative administration.”
Like the one-person/one-vote rule, the 50% rule constituted:
[A]n objective, numerical test . . . [that was n]ot an arbitrary
invention . . . [but] has its foundation in principles of democratic
governance. The special significance in the democratic process, of a
majority, means it is a special wrong when a minority group has 50
percent or more of the voting population and could constitute a

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 370, 372 (N.C. 2007).
Id. at 374.
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244 (2009).
Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689).
Id.
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. at 1237.
Id. at 1244.
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compact voting majority but, despite racially polarized bloc voting, that
509
group is not put into a district.

Whereas the Ashcroft Court had urged that simple math and brightline rules be abandoned as measures for vote dilution under section 5,
Strickland insists that judicial manageability and the algebra of
democracy compel that minority voting age population in an ability-toelect district must exceed 50% of the population in that district. Whereas
Ashcroft held that coalition districts and influence districts could, under
appropriate circumstances, satisfy federal requirements under section 5,
Strickland now holds that neither can serve as a remedy for minority vote
dilution claims under the Constitution, regardless of state or local
circumstances. In so ruling, the Strickland Court undercut Ashcroft’s
vision of political progress through the gradual integration that appears,
more generally, to have animated Justice O’Connor’s voting rights
decisions.
The rationale behind the 50% rule in Strickland represents a
significant departure from vote dilution principles. As Justice Souter
pointed out in his dissent, the number of minority seats in the legislature
and the other senate factors should guide the appropriate vote dilution
analysis, including a history of government-sponsored racial
510
discrimination. It makes no sense to focus on “equal opportunity” in
the particular remedial district.
Moreover, Strickland further complicates the relationship between
section 5 and section 2. In the past, as in Ashcroft, for example, the DOJ
carefully scrutinized population reductions in minority opportunity
districts. But it has neither relied solely on BVAP, nor has it objected to
reductions below 50% BVAP in every case. The Attorney General has
not objected to even massive reductions in minority voting age
populations in majority-minority districts, so long as a minority candidate
511
in the district could rely on sufficient cross-over voting. Under
Strickland, it now appears that crossover or coalition districts are no
longer protected as ability-to-elect districts. If the Court’s definition of
“ability to elect” districts under section 2 also applies to ability-to-elect
districts under the new section 5, then it would seem to follow that
section 5 also no longer protects coalition districts. In other words, the
DOJ cannot object to the elimination of coalition districts under the

509. Id. at 1245.
510. Id. at 1251 (Souter, J., dissenting).
511. For example, in the state senate districting plan at issue in Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Attorney
General did not object to Senate District No. 22, which “has a total black population of 54.71%. The
proposed Senate District 22 would experience a decrease in BVAP from 63.51% (Ga.) or 62.65%
(U.S.), to 51.15% (Ga.) or 50.76% (U.S.). The percentage of black registered voters would also fall
from 64.07% to 49.44%.” 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 63 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations omitted), vacated, 539 U.S.
461, 472–73 (2003).
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retrogression standard, if coalition districts no longer count as protected
minority opportunity districts. Either the DOJ must now insist on
packing minorities into 50%-plus BVAP districts, even in instances
where this is entirely unnecessary, or risk losing those districts forever.
Strickland thereby threatens to reverse the trend of gradual reductions in
minority voting age population that the Supreme Court had previously
welcomed. Instead of empowering state and local jurisdictions to adopt
“best practices” and to unpack majority-minority districts as much as
possible, depending on local conditions, Strickland now requires
adherence to a rigid 50% rule, giving jurisdictions no choice in the
matter. Unlike NAMUDNO, which interpreted the coverage provision to
grant local jurisdictions the autonomy to bail out from under section 5,
thereby encouraging the adoption of best practices, Strickland insists on
uniformity and locks majority-minority districts in place.

Conclusion
Decentralization has frequently been invoked as a justification for
our constitutional federalism. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, for example,
Justice O’Connor wrote that:
Th[e] federalist structure . . . . assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting
512
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.

Others have similarly justified federalism in terms of the democratic and
513
pragmatic benefits of state and local autonomy. If we credit this
functional, substantive account of constitutional federalism, the scope
and extent of section 5’s actual interference with state and local decision
making matters greatly in assessing the “federalism costs” of the
preclearance regime.
Part I described the conventional view of section 5 preclearance as a
“nationalization” of governmental authority over state and local election
laws. This view suggests the imposition of uniform minimum standards
below which no experimentation is permitted. The one-person/one-vote
rule is exemplary in this respect. It is a one-size-fits-all rule that tolerates
514
no variation. Conservative critics of the VRA claim that section 5
512. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
513. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 141, at 27 (describing federalism as “constitutionally mandated
decentralization” that promotes local preferences); Cariello, supra note 141, at 1558–69 (arguing that
“federalism is [a] theory of decentralization in government,” discussing literature, and urging that the
Supreme Court adopt a functional approach to federalism); McGinnis, supra note 141, at 526
(“[F]ederalism . . . was the Framers’ most important contribution to protecting decentralized
traditionmaking.”).
514. Standards for variation of state and local legislative districts are slightly more flexible than
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preclearance is even more intrusive. A leading opponent of affirmative
action, who held senior positions under Presidents Reagan and Bush in
the CRD deplores that “Section 5 prohibits more state voting practices
than those necessarily encompassed by the explicit prohibition on
intentional discrimination found in the text of the Fifteenth
515
Amendment.”
But as we have shown in Part III, section 5 has, in many respects,
been far more permissive than the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, both of which also apply. The institutional architecture of
section 5 preclearance did not require strict compliance with uniform
minimum constitutional standards. Only new laws must be precleared.
Laws that were not changed were not subject to preclearance. The DOJ’s
initial implementation during the 1970s and 1980s, furthermore, did not
require strict compliance for new laws either, but took a pragmatic
approach that aimed at workable incremental improvements. The
516
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Richmond institutionalized this
approach by approving a compromise that fell short of the disparate
impact provision in the preclearance standard. In Beer, the Supreme
Court further insisted that preclearance could only be denied in cases of
517
retrogression or “backsliding.” In other words, a pure discriminatory
effects standard was never applied. The DOJ typically relied on
discriminatory intent after Beer, and when it did apply retrogressive
effect, it was usually in combination with discriminatory intent or other
518
standards articulated by the federal courts. Unlike the equipopulation
rule, preclearance did not require covered jurisdictions to adopt a
particular election design and did not apply to existing laws. It required
decisionmakers to take changing national antidiscrimination standards
into account. As these standards evolved in the courts, the DOJ’s
standards of review evolved as well. But, as has been shown in the
examination of the different phases of implementation, the DOJ’s
preclearance standard has always remained more permissive. Moreover,
the Supreme Court increasingly narrowed the discretion of the DOJ to
push for any improvement in racial vote discrimination, prohibiting the

standards for congressional districts, but the rule is nationally uniform. Hasen, supra note 466, at 1480–
81.
515. Roger Clegg, The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Bartlett and NAMUDNO, in Cato
Supreme Court Review 2008–2009, at 35, 46 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2009) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2523 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2009/BartlettNAMUDNO-Clegg.pdf; see
also Dep’t of Justice, Briefing Report: Voting Rights Enforcement for the 2008 U.S. Presidential
Election 60–61 (2009) (testimony of Roger Clegg, President & Gen. Counsel, Ctr. for Equal
Opportunity).
516. 422 U.S. 359 (1974).
517. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1975).
518. See Posner, supra note 168, at 98–99.
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DOJ from applying even the undisputed constitutional intent standard.
The VRARA restored the constitutional intent standard, but the Shaw
decisions, precluding redistricting efforts from relying “predominantly” on
race, still restrict the DOJ’s discretion.
Given the continuing hyper-decentralization of election law and
administration, it would be disingenuous of critics to suggest that
preclearance has undermined state and local participation in
decisionmaking. The preclearance regime has not displaced
decisionmakers, nor diminished local participation in the process. To the
contrary, the very design of the administrative preclearance process has
encouraged increased levels of local participation and deliberation by
requiring submissions to include evidence of public notice, comment, and
participation of those affected by election law changes. It has required
decisionmakers to take antidiscrimination standards into account. But that
was an obligation they had under the Constitution anyhow—whether or
not they were covered by Section 5. Section 5 certainly has encouraged
jurisdictions to integrate those standards into their decisionmaking
procedures. Moreover, preclearance has enforced antidiscrimination with
a minimum of litigation, primarily by requiring jurisdictions to publicize
information standardized to permit an assessment of discriminatory impact
or intent. The production of information to the DOJ and minority groups
has enabled negotiations among affected interests and has educated local
decisionmakers about the application of antidiscrimination standards in
their decisionmaking. It has also put local jurisdictions in direct dialogue
with the DOJ.
The ratio of objections to submissions was highest when preclearance
first became mandatory, and declined dramatically as submissions
increased and antidiscrimination standards became well established. This
means that the relative burden on jurisdictions significantly declined as
conditions improved. With less than 1% of submissions drawing objections
in the 1990s, and many fewer objections interposed during the period from
2000 to 2006, the burden in all but the rarest of cases has involved
producing the information relating to new election laws to the DOJ and
the public. Even if the DOJ lodged an objection, preclearance was still
much less burdensome than litigation, much faster, much less costly, much
less adversarial, and permitted a much speedier resolution.
The NAMUDNO Court signaled that it would revisit the
constitutionality of preclearance, but did not resolve what standard would
520
apply. Under the more stringent standard that the Supreme Court
519. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).
520. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512–13 (2009) (“The parties
do not agree on the standard to apply in deciding whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress
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articulated in City of Boerne v. Flores, Congress’s enforcement powers
under the Civil War Amendments are limited to legislating a “congruent
521
and proportional” remedy to an ongoing constitutional violation.
Part III also showed that preclearance has functioned for the most
part as a learning/monitoring regime that, in over 99% of all cases, has
simply required the production of information. In those rare cases in which
an objection has been lodged, the DOJ’s concerns usually could be
satisfied by limited changes to the jurisdiction’s chosen election design.
The showing that preclearance is not nearly as invasive as suggested
counters arguments that the VRA’s federalism costs are
“disproportionate.” It detracts considerably from the conventional,
heretofore unchallenged, claim that the VRA’s federalism costs should
weigh heavily in the constitutional balance. It is, moreover, important to
understand the success of the VRA in institutionalizing a national
antidiscrimination policy as being closely linked to its relative tolerance of
local decisionmaking, its encouragement of transparency and dialogue at
the local level about acceptable governance of electoral design and
administration, and the broader local participation in the political process
that it has fostered—without cutting previously existing powerful
constituencies out of these negotiations, but engaging them. These insights
should be helpful in the current debate about how the preclearance
regime, and the VRA as a whole, should be modified to reflect historical
developments—including, for example, the transformation of election
administration at the state and local levels due to the impact of
technological innovation. Key issues that will have to be addressed are the
coverage provision and the Ashcroft fix. Both issues have been the subject
of ongoing debate and are beyond the immediate scope of this Article.
Section 5 preclearance exemplifies an approach to social and political
change that has received attention in the legal literature by so-called “new
institutionalists.” New institutional economists have shown the way here.
New institutionalists share the recognition that “institutions” are practices
of informal and formal social orderings. Formal legal rules and
standards—namely, governments—shape institutions, but are significantly
constrained and shaped by existing structures and their path-dependent
522
Institutions embody power relations and
processes of evolution.
exceeded its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power in extending the preclearance requirements.
The district argues that ‘[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end’; the Federal Government asserts that it is
enough that the legislation be a ‘rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition.’ That
question has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it. The Act’s preclearance
requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions under either test.”
(internal citations omitted)).
521. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
522. According to economist Douglass North, institutions are “rules of the game in a society,” or
more formally “the human devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Douglass North,
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arrangements between individuals and groups but, importantly, also
embody social techniques and learning. My own emphasis here is on the
persistence and structure of institutional change, which is not something to
be contended with only occasionally, but is the context in which all
policymaking takes place. In addition to the constitutional implications set
forth above, this examination of section 5 preclearance serves as a case
study in this larger theoretical inquiry.
Even stable institutions must evolve in response to social and
demographic changes. New social groups emerge and pursue institutional
changes to promote their own interests. As reformers, we want to
progress existing social structures to promote rights, welfare, or more
particular values. Sophisticated reformers all recognize that institutional
change produces dislocation of existing practices, but the focus is all too
often on innovation and progress. A natural blind spot is the failure
sufficiently to recognize not merely the disruption of existing practices,
but that all change involves intervention into complex ecosystems,
inevitably causing unintended consequences. Existing practices and
routines embody particular techniques, experiences, and knowledge sets
acquired and passed on by local actors and groups. Institutional change
compromises those power positions—often intentionally so. But it also
threatens the disruption, displacement, or loss of the techniques and
knowledge sets that underwrite contested practices. Local knowledge
connected with contested practices, however, may produce positive
externalities or spillovers in areas that are not targeted for reform, or in
practices related to reform efforts that must nonetheless be preserved or
fostered for reform to succeed. In the area of civil rights, the emphasis
has understandably often been on the elimination of violations. What the
success of section 5 shows, however, is that civil rights efforts answer to
the more general dynamics of institutional change.

Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 3 (1990).

